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William Magnuson*
ABSTRACT

State sovereignty has long held a revered post in
international law, but it received a blow in the aftermath of
World War II, when the world realized the full extent of
atrocitiesperpetrated by the Nazis on their own citizens. In the
postwar period, the idea that individuals possessed rights
independent of their own states gained a foothold in world
discussions, and a proliferation of human rights treaties
guaranteeingfundamental rights followed. These rights were,
for the most part, unenforceable, though, and in the 1990s, a
number of humanitariancatastrophes(in Kosovo, Rwanda, and
Somalia) galvanized the internationalcommunity to develop a
doctrine to protect the fundamental rights of all individuals.
The resulting "responsibility to protect" individuals from
genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity stood
as a radical rejection of the prewar concept of state sovereignty
and assured that states could no longer hide behind the shield
of territorial integrity. But the doctrine created another
disconnect in international law: it picked out only a few
fundamental rights for protection, leaving citizens to rely on the

Special thanks to Ryan Goodman, Rachel Brewster, and Richard Parker for their
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whim of their states to protect their other rights. This Article
argues that this state of the law is no longer sustainable,as it is
still beholden in important ways to the now-eroded concept of
state sovereignty. The responsibility to protect should be
expanded to include protection of fundamental rights in general
and the freedom of speech in particular. The inclusion of the
freedom of expression in the pantheon of protected rights is
broadly consistent with the moral, legal, and consequentialist
arguments in favor of the internationalnorm of responsibility to
protect. Moreover, an expansive reading of the obligation to
intervene, particularlyin nontraditionalways, will increase the
legitimacy of the internationalsystem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International law has long recognized the state as the primaryeven sole-actor in international affairs, reserving to countries a
number of powerful prerogatives such as the right to territorial
integrity.' This important principle of international law, however,
began to erode after the end of the Second World War, when the
atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime upon its own citizens
shocked the conscience of the entire world. 2 For the first time, the
idea that international law should protect the rights of individuals
started to gain traction in legal circles, leading to a proliferation of
international human rights treaties in the postwar era.3 These
treaties guaranteed a widening array of fundamental human rights:
life, liberty, freedom from torture, freedom of speech, and many
others.4
But this development led to a contradiction in the
international legal regime: suddenly, individual rights ascended to
the level of international law, but the long-held principles of
inviolable state sovereignty remained. Treaties promised certain

1.
See FREDRICK EDWIN SMITH, INTERNATIONAL LAw 28 (BiblioLife 2009)
(1906) ("States and states alone enjoy a locus standi in the law of nations: they are the
only wearers of international personality.").
2.
Sheila McLean, The Right to Reproduce, in HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM
RHETORIC TO REALITY 99, 111 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 1986).
3.
Id.
4.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (hereinafter UDHR].
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rights to individuals, but at the same time, states were granted sole
control over their internal matters.5 There was little or no way to
enforce the provisions of the human rights treaties on recalcitrant
states.
All this changed in the 1990s after a series of humanitarian
disasters in far-flung parts of the world such as Kosovo, Rwanda, and
Somalia. The world community recognized that there existed a moral
duty to intervene to prevent the massacre of minority populations in
these countries, but the contemporary legal framework forbade any
intervention in the "internal" matters of states.6 As long as states
persecuted only their own citizens, there was little that other states
could do legally to stop the violence. In some cases, such as Kosovo,
the international community did intervene, leading to fierce debates
about the legality of bombing campaigns. 7 These debates created
pressure on the United Nations (UN) and the world's powers to
establish a new legal norm-one allowing for humanitarian
intervention in certain limited situations. This pressure, in turn, led
to the formation of the doctrine of a responsibility to protect.8 The
rule held that individual states have a responsibility to protect their
citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other large-scale loss of
life, and if a country were unable or unwilling to do so, the
responsibility would fall upon the broader community of states. 9 The
use of military force to protect citizens from such catastrophic harms
would be permitted.10
That is where the norm stands today. But the establishment of a
responsibility to protect under international law has led to yet
another contradiction. The fundamental problem with the pre-World
War II legal regime was that it acknowledged state sovereignty as
inviolable, leaving individual citizens at the whim of their
governments." The concept of international law's peculiar nation-tonation character-giving the state the principal role in global

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
5.
6.
See infra text accompanying notes 74-75 (discussing the view that
currently international law does not permit intervention in any matter that is
considered an internal matter of a state).

7.
See Dan Sarooshi, The Security Council's Authorization of Regional
Arrangements to Use Force: The Case of NATO, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 226, 24244 (Vaughan Lowe et al, eds., 2008) (outlining historical discussions of the legality of
the NATO campaign in Kosovo).
8.
See generally INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 11-16 (2001) (discussing the development of the
doctrine of the responsibility to protect under international law).
Id. at XI.
9.
10.
See id. at 31 (discussing the use of force as an extreme resort).
11.
JACK MAHONEY,
THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGIN,
DEVELOPMENT, AND SIGNIFICANCE 42-53 (2007).
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relations-was crucial to the pre-World War II era. 12 This logic,
however, became unsustainable after World War II when the extent
of Nazi atrocities became known.1 3 It was this development that
paved the way for the creation of the responsibility to protect
doctrine. And yet, that same pre-World War II logic prevails in
international law's treatment of other fundamental rights such as the
freedom of speech. 14 So the freedom of speech, although guaranteed
by a number of important international treaties, is still considered an
internal matter. 15 The international community has no responsibility
to protect the freedom of expression, and indeed, states may invoke
the principle of nonintervention when confronted with criticisms of
the suppression of speech inside their borders.1 6 Under the current
understanding of the international law of free speech then, the state
has exclusive control over its territory and people, a position darkly
reminiscent of the pre-World War II era.
But a world that demands respect for human rights cannot
coexist with a world that demands absolute respect for state
sovereignty. The dominant theory of the post-World War II era is
that the nonintervention principle is legitimately subject to certain
exceptions because states have obligations to their citizens. 17 What is
not adequately understood today, but what is undeniably valid, is
that this logic applies equally to both interventions to protect
populations from widespread violations of their right to free
expression and interventions to protect populations from genocide.
Here, as elsewhere, human rights treaties have guaranteed to all
individuals certain rights-rights that now form part of the nucleus
of international law. The respect for state sovereignty cannot trump
these rights any more in the area of free speech than in the area of
genocide.
This is not to argue that violations of free speech rights should
warrant military invasion. Indeed, such a proposition might even
weaken, rather than strengthen, the legitimacy of the international
system. Instead, nontraditional forms of intervention would, in most
cases, provide a more acceptable form of protecting the freedom of
speech from infringement. The proactive use of technologies-such as

See SMITH, supra note 1, at 28.
12.
13.
See McLean, supra note 2, at 111 ("The [Nazis'] large-scale abuse of
noncombatants which characterized [World War II] made discussion of human rights in
general more urgent and more meaningful.").
14.
See infra Part IV (discussing state sovereignty and free speech).
15.
Id.
16.
See infra text accompanying notes 204-205 (discussing the invocation of
non-intervention by certain states when they were criticized for suppression of free
speech by the international community).
17.
See infra Part IV (discussing the erosion of the theory that states have
absolute control over their own internal affairs in favor of a recognition that states owe
their citizens certain basic obligations).
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the internet, radio, and television-is just one example of potential
forms of intervention.
This Article explores these assertions about the proper role of
international law in the protection of the freedom of expression. Part
II provides a brief history of the development of the doctrine of a
responsibility to protect from the end of the Second World War to
today. Part III examines the relevant documents elaborating what
exactly the freedom of speech protects in international law. Part IV
describes the interaction between sovereignty and free speech. Part
V briefly surveys the major arguments (moral, legal, and
consequential) in favor of the current responsibility to protect rule,
and Part VI applies these arguments to a more expansive view of the
responsibility to protect that includes protection of free speech. Part
VII addresses potential criticisms of this argument, particularly those
relating to its practicality and the use of humanitarian intervention
as a pretext for war.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A. From National Sovereignty to Human Rights
The development of the concept of a responsibility to protect
came as a logical outgrowth of a larger trend in international legal
doctrine under which individuals increasingly became a subject of
and an actor in international law. For hundreds of years, states acted
as the sole participants in international law: only states created
international law and only they were subject to it. 18 But this longheralded principle of international law began to erode in the period
after World War II, as both the atrocities of that period and political
exigencies put pressure on states to bring individual rights under the
wing of international protection.1 9 After a series of international
catastrophes and humanitarian interventions in the 1990s and
2000s,20 the responsibility to protect norm gradually gained

18.
See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEPHEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 111

(2d ed. 2006) ("Orthodox international law doctrine has regarded states as the primary,
or even sole, actors in international law . . . since only] they could create and be the
direct subject of international legal obligations.").
19.
See McLean, supra note 2, at 111.
20.
But see Mats Berdal, The Security Council and Peacekeeping, in THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE SINCE 1945, supra note 7, at 175, 191-93 (noting the poor record of UN

peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, but citing different reasons for those operational
failures, including the large increase in volume and complexity of UN field operations,
and the occasional tensions and conflicts among UN member countries, especially the
P5).
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widespread consensus and today stands as an important-even if
controversial-pillar of international law. 21
As the Earl of Birkenhead put it in 1927, less than twenty years
before the radical changes in international law facilitated by World
War II, "States and states alone enjoy a locus standi in the law of
nations: they are the only wearers of international personality." 22 In
other words, only states possessed full international legal personality,
a status that allowed them to have both rights and duties under
international law. This situation made sense when international law
dealt primarily with relations between states: the creation of treaties,
the laws of war, maritime law, jurisdiction over territories, etc. 3 So,
Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis established such foundational
principles as the applicability of the laws of war to all parties without
regard to the justness of the war, extraterritoriality of ambassadors,
and freedom of the seas. 24 Of course, some of these rules dealt with
the rights of individuals, but actions could only be considered
violations of international law to the extent that they were injuries to
the state.2 5
After World War I, treaties and international organizations
began to recognize the importance of protecting groups, and not just
states, under international law. 26 The instability created in Europe
by the presence of large minorities in many countries gave rise to

21.

INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at

11-16 (discussing the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect under
international law).
22.
SMITH, supra note 1, at 28.
23.
See WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1991)
(explaining that early writers on international law focused primarily on topics of just
wars and the rules for conducting them, the laws of treaties, extraterritoriality, and the
theoretical foundations of international law).
24.
2 HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR
AND PEACE: THREE BOOKS] 599, 602, 629 (Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., Clarendon
Press 1925) (1625) (asserting (1) that what is permissible in war arises, in part, from
the law of nature; (2) that a warring state does not possess the right to interfere with
trade in goods not useful in war; and (3) the extraterritoriality of ambassadors).
25.
In 1924, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated,
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to
protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law
committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain
satisfaction through ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right ... to
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12
(Aug. 30).
26.
See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM 16-30 (Greenwood Press 1969) (describing the system of protecting minority
groups under the League of Nations).
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intensified interest in the rights of those minorities. 27 Woodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points, aiming at installing a durable international
system, invoked the concept of self-determination to ensure the right
of nations to choose their own governments. 2 8 Indeed, the victors of
World War I worried that the presence of national minorities in a
state could lead to another war, either through discriminatory
treatment of the minority by the government or through excessive
demands on the government by the minority. 29 Therefore, in the 1919
Paris Peace Conference, the victors imposed treaties on the defeated
or reconfigured states aimed at guaranteeing fair treatment to
members of minority groups.3 0 These guarantees mandated that the
states enable minorities to maintain their unique cultural, linguistic,
religious, and other differences. 3' At the same time, efforts to
improve working conditions for laborers started to operate at the
international level.
The International Labour Office (now the
International Labour Organization) was founded in 1919 to promote

27.

See David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights,

66 FORDHAM L. REV. 597, 599-600 (1997) (stating that in the aftermath of WWI, the
claims of national groups concerning the rights of minorities "dominated the
international legal agenda").
28.
Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points are reprinted in MARGARET
MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: Six MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 495-96 (2001). He
described the concept of self-determination more thoroughly in a speech at Billings,
Montana in 1919:
'The fundamental principle of [self-determination] is a principle never
acknowledged before, a principle which had its birth and has had its growth in
this country: that the countries of the world belong to the people who live in
them, and that they have a right to determine their own destiny and their own
form of government and their own form of policy, and that no body of
statesmen, sitting anywhere, no matter whether they represent the
overwhelming physical force of the world or not, has the right to assign any
great people to a sovereignty under which it does not care to live.'
WILSON'S IDEALS 109 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1942) (quoting President Woodrow Wilson,
Speech at Billings, Montana (Sept. 11, 1919)). For a good description of the
development of the idea of self-determination, see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELFDETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 11-33 (1995).
29.
CLAUDE, supra note 26, at 13-14; Wippman, supra note 27, at 599-600.
30.
CLAUDE, supra note 26, at 13-15.
31.
See, e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 62, at 17 (April 6) (noting that one purpose of the treaty was to "ensure for the
minority elements suitable means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities,
their traditions, their national characteristics"); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study of the Rights

of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 1 100, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/REV.1 (1979) (prepared by Francesco Capotorti) ("[Pirovision was
made for special measures deriving from the idea of safeguarding the values peculiar to
each minority group, namely, language, religion and culture.").
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better conditions for workers and their families. 32 But despite the
fact that groups were increasingly being recognized as important
actors in the international arena, these efforts were limited in their
focus and dealt to a large extent with individual states.3 3 States still
considered the treatment of their citizens as an internal matter.34
After World War II, though, the international consensus on what
amounted to internal affairs began to shift, and the individual
became a more central party in international law.35 The atrocities
committed during the war by the Nazi regime forced states to
reconsider the status of individuals in the international legal
system.3 6 Traditionally, the doctrine of state responsibility held that
states could be held accountable for injuries to aliens, that is, noncitizens. 3 7 But if a state was persecuting its own citizens, it could
hardly be expected to hold itself accountable. In order to remedy this
situation, the victorious Allied Powers thus committed themselves to
prosecuting the members of the Nazi regime responsible for the most
reprehensible crimes committed during the war.3 8 In the ensuing
Nuremberg trials, individuals were prosecuted for crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including crimes
committed by a state against its own nationals.3 9
In the postwar period, pressure to create a kind of "international
bill of rights" for individuals began to mount. 40 The Holocaust had
exposed the flaws in the prevalent international legal regime, and
many organizations believed that the only way to correct the flaws
was to enshrine the human rights of individuals in an international
treaty. 4 1 Therefore, in the negotiations leading to the creation of the
UN, groups like the American Law Institute, the International

32.

For a history of the International Labour Organization, see Carlos R.

Carrion Crespo, When Labor Law Went Global: The Road to the InternationalLabor
Organization,37 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 129, 142-47 (2002).
33.
PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2003).

34.
Id.
35.
See McLean, supra note 2, at 111 (stating that in response to the Nazi
atrocities, the U.N. "promulgated a number of agreements protecting the sanctity of
the individual, and states and courts began to review their policies in light of changing
world opinion").

36.

See id.

37.

See TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF

STATE RESPONSIBILITY 11 (2006) (discussing the evolution of State responsibility
including responsibility for wrongful conduct against non-nationals).
38.
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing an International Military Tribunal for the
"trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis").
39.
See id. art. 6 (listing the offenses to be tried by the International Military
Tribunal).
40.
See CLAUDE, supra note 26, at 163 (describing failed proposals before the
U.N. General Assembly for a multilateral convention toward establishing minority
rights following World War II).
41.
Id.
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Labour Organization, the American Jewish Committee, and the
American Bar Association drafted potential bills of rights to be
included in the UN Charter. 42 Latin American states lobbied for the
inclusion of a bill of rights as well, with twenty-one states coming out
in favor of the bill after the Inter-American Conference on War and
Peace. 43 While the Charter did not contain such a bill of rights, it did
include a number of references to human rights. The Preamble states
the determination of the signatories to "reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights."4 4 Article 55 commits the UN to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all . . . ."45 Article 56 commits the members to "take
joint and separate action ... for the achievement" of universal respect
for human rights. 46 Perhaps most importantly, Article 68 of the
Charter calls for the creation of a commission for the promotion of
human rights. 47 These commitments led President Harry Truman to
say in his final address to the drafting conference that "[u]nder this
document we have good reason to expect the framing of an
international bill of rights, acceptable to all nations involved," one
that "will be as much a part of international life as our own Bill of
Rights is a part of our Constitution."4 8
In the aftermath of the foundation of the UN, treaties and
agencies devoted to the protection of individual human rights
proliferated. 49 In 1946, the Human Rights Commission was formed.5 0
In 1948, both the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of

42.

DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supranote 18, at 443.

43.
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, MEXICO
CITY, FEBRUARY 21-MARCH 8, 1945 (1945), reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES OF AMERICAN STATES 1942-1954 51, 51 (Pan American Union ed., 2d

Supp. 1958).
44.
U.N. Charter pmbl.
45.
Id. art. 55(c).
46.
Id. art. 56.
47.
Id. art. 68.
48.
President Harry Truman, Address at the United Nations Conference on
International Organization Final Plenary Session (June 26, 1945), in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
July 1945, at 5.
49.
See McLean, supra note 2, at 111; PAUL SIEGHART, supra note 33, at 14-15
(describing the influx of intergovernmental organizations and treaties "specifically
concerned with the relations between governments and their own subjects"); LOUIs B.
SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50535 (1973) (discussing the U.N. and human rights); Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of
Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1128 (1982) (referencing
the many resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly that have been passed in the years
following the creation of the U.N. Charter toward the advancement of aspirations
defined in Article 56 of the Charter); Louis Henkin, The InternationalHuman Rights
Treaties: Some Problems of Policy and Interpretation, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 886, 886-88
(1978) (describing the Carter administration's reliance on treaties as a means toward
promoting human rights in the international sphere).
50.
ECOSOC Res. 5 (1),
1, U.N. Doc. E120 (Feb. 15, 1946) (creating the
Human Rights Commission).
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the Crime of Genocide51 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights5 2 were adopted. In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) was created.5 3 Together, these treaties
protect an impressive array of individual rights, from freedom of
expression and religion to freedom from discrimination.54
While the codification of individual human rights into
international treaty regimes undoubtedly created socialization effects
throughout the international system, 55 there remained a significant
disconnect between the broad range of rights protected and the
limited recourse that individuals had to enforce those rights.5 6 The
limitations were twofold: first, the treaties only bound the states that
ratified them; and second, the individuals were forced to rely
primarily on their own states to protect their rights, even if it was
that very state that was violating these rights.5 7
A fundamental tenet of customary international law and treaty
interpretation holds that treaties become binding on a state only once

51.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/260
(Dec. 9, 1948).
52.
UDHR, supra note 4.
53.
Other important treaties protecting individual human rights include: the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S.
243; ICCPR, supra note 4; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195;
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514 (XV), 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AIRES/15/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960);
the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Dec. 20, 1952, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; and
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19 ("Everyone shall have the right to
54.
freedom of expression. . . ."); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, supra note 53, art. 2(1) ("States Parties... undertake to
pursue . . . a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms ....
); UDHR,
supra note 4, art. 18 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. . .. ").
55.
For a discussion of the socializing effect of international human rights law,
see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
56.
See infra text accompanying note 61 (describing the very limited means
that individuals had to pursue their rights, despite the relatively broad scope of those
rights).
57.
See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, supra note 53, arts. 2, 4 (imposing obligations on state
signatories, but providing no avenue for individuals to vindicate the rights the
Convention affords).

266

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 43:255

they have been ratified by that state.5 8 This rule is not merely a de
minimis restriction on the enforcement of individual rights. The
United States, for example, habitually declines to ratify treaties that
it has played an influential role in shaping. It has not ratified the
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW); or the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC).5 9 Furthermore, it took twenty-six years for the Senate
to ratify the ICCPR. 6 0
In addition, individuals whose rights were violated generally had
to rely on their own state, rather than a separate entity, to remedy
the wrong, even when it was the state that was violating the rights. 61
With respect to the fulfillment of rights, only rarely does a treaty
grant an individual the right to petition an international agency for
redress against the violations of a state. One example is the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, which states that an individual has an
extremely limited right to submit a brief to an international
committee of experts, which in turn can decide to commence an
investigation of the purportedly violating state. 62 CEDAW embodied
the more traditional treaty form: the signatories - committed
themselves to protecting various rights of women, and a committee
was formed to monitor compliance, but no right was bestowed upon
individuals to petition for redress of particular violations of the
treaty.6 3 Only in 2000 did the General Assembly of the UN adopt an
Optional Protocol to CEDAW, thereby granting individual women the
right to petition a committee of experts to investigate violations of
their rights. 64

58.
This tenet of international law was codified in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. According to Article 34 of that document, "[a] treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 321.
59.
See, e.g., Joe Stork, Human Rights and U.S. Policy, FOREIGN POLY IN
1999, http://www.fpif.org/reports/human-rights-and-us-policy
FOCUS, Mar. 31,
(discussing the many treaties that Washington has failed to ratify and the implications
of those failures to ratify).
60.
See id. (noting that the U.S. did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992).
61.
LEVI, supra note 23, at 181.
62.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights arts. 1-5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302; U.N. Human Rights Comm.,

Introduction to Selected Decisions Under the Optional Protocol (Second to Sixteenth
Sessions), 1 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985).
See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
63.
Women, supra note 53, art. 17 (establishing the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women to monitor the progress made in implementing the
convention).
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
64.
Discrimination Against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83. For a discussion of the
importance of the Optional Protocol, see Felipe Gomez Isa, The Optional Protocol for

the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women:
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B. Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect
In the period after World War II and extending into the 1990s,
the international community increasingly subscribed to an expansive
view of individual rights under international law.6 5 This awareness
gave rise to the innumerable human rights treaties and organizations
that exist to this day. At the same time, the concept of the
inviolability of state sovereignty existed in uneasy equilibrium with
the new world of human rights. In the 1990s, mass atrocities in farflung parts of the globe pricked the consciences of many democratic
publics, leading to humanitarian interventions to stop the conflicts. 66
The juxtaposition of the moral imperative of intervention with its
concomitant illegality in the international system led to pressure to
change the legal rules governing the use of force. The result was the
development in the early 2000s of the concept of the responsibility to
protect, a radical departure from the foundations of international law
but a logical response to the steady progression of individual rights. 67
It should be noted at this point that the inviolability of state
sovereignty was codified in as important a document as the UN
Charter of 1945. Article 2(7) of that document states that "[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state .... ."68 While this provision relates solely to
the competence of the UN, intervention in the domestic matters of
states by other states is also prevented by a customary norm of
international law. 69 Despite the fact that the UN Charter was

Strengthening the Protection Mechanisms of Women's Human Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 291 (2003).
See McLean, supra note 2, at 111.
65.
66.
See generally NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 172-284 (2000) (discussing humanitarian

intervention in the various cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo). But see
Berdal, supra note 20, at 191-93 (noting the poor record of U.N. peacekeeping missions
in the 1990s).
Protect,
the
Responsibility
to
International
Coalition
for
67.
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) ("The responsibility to
protect is a new international security and human rights norm to address the
international community's failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.").
68.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. For an in-depth discussion of the meaning of

Article 2(7), see Kristen Walker, An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter as an Embodiment of the Public/PrivateDistinction in InternationalLaw, 26
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 173 (1994).
69.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (7th ed.
2008). See also Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) (noting that customary norms prevent states from interfering in
the domestic affairs of other states); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
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drafted before the proliferation of human rights treaties in the
postwar period, it is clear that the noninterference principle was
meant to include human rights issues, as the Charter mentioned the
promotion of human rights as one of the UN's purposes.7 0 In other
words, it was never foreseen that the violation of human rights could
become a justification for the use of force. This abrogation of one jus
ad bellum was incorporated into Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
which stated, "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state ... ."7
The reaffirmation of the principle of nonintervention in the UN
Charter came in the face of the Nuremberg trials, which seemed to
indicate that actors involved in the widespread violation of human
rights could be prosecuted in the international system.7 2 After all,
the drafters of the charter for the military tribunals at Nuremberg
included a reference to crimes against humanity as a crime within
the jurisdiction of the court.7 3 But the principle of noninterference,
according to the UN Charter, took precedence. 74 As one scholar has
described the situation, "In this normative context, other rules of
international law-including the principles of human rights-are
only valid insofar as they are compatible with the basic norm of the
non-use of force and the subsequent norm of non-interference in
internal affairs."7 5
The Charter did contain one escape valve, though. Under Article
42, the Security Council could use such force "as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security," if it considered
that other measures would be inadequate. 76 In other words, the UN

Awards 829, 838 (Apr. 4, 1928) (explaining that the "principle of the exclusive
competence of the State in regard to its own territory [has developed] in such a way as
to make it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international
relations"); M.S. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION 5-6 (2d
ed.1961) (discussing sovereignty, including the right of the state to regulate its own
domestic affairs, and stating that "the recognition of the independence of states is a
fundamental rule of international law").
70.
U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3.
71.
Id. art. 2, para. 4. See also HANS KOCHLER, THE CONCEPT OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN POWER POLITICS 18 (2001)
(noting that this principle was incorporated into article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter).
72.
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 38, art. 1.
73.
Id. art. 6(c).
74.
U.N. Charter art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.").
75.
KOCHLER, supra note 71, at 19.
76.
U.N. Charter art. 42. For a discussion of the use of force under the U.N.

Charter, see Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?: Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970); The United Nations Charterand

the Use of Force:Is Article 2(4) Still Workable?, 78 AMER. Soc. INTL L. PRoc. 68 (1984).
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Charter unequivocally bans the use of force by individual states and
gives that right to the collectivity of states under the leadership of the
Security Council.7 7
But this sole method for maintaining
international peace and, presumably, protecting individuals from
widespread violations of their rights functioned abysmally in
practice.7 8 Paralyzed by the rivalry between the Soviet Union and
the United States during the Cold War, the UN system betrayed its
promise to be the source of a stable and durable peace.79 The
overlapping system of human rights treaties only served to highlight
the impotence of the Security Council. So, in the 1970s, when Pol Pot
was massacring millions in Cambodia, the world stood by.80 Indeed,
when Vietnam entered Cambodia to stop the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam
was condemned for violating international law.8 1
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold
War, hopes rose that the UN could assume the role envisioned for it
by the founders. George H.W. Bush announced the beginning of a
"New World Order" in which the UN and the United States would act
together to maintain an "enduring peace." 82 Indeed, this optimistic

77.
It is not entirely accurate to say that the U.N. Charter bans the use of
force. Article 51 preserves the right of states to defend against an armed attack. U.N.
Charter art. 51.
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.

Id.
78.

See J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Security Council in the Wings: Exploring the

Security Council's Non-involvement in Wars, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EvoLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, supra note

7, at 494, 494-503 (exploring several reasons for the generally inactive Security
Council during the Cold War, including the American-Soviet rivalry, the over-use of the
Security Council veto, and the U.N.'s lack of resources); see generally ANDREW BOYD,
FIFTEEN MEN ON A POWDER KEG: A HISTORY OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (1971)

(discussing the history of the U.N. Security Council, including successes and failures).
79.
See Dunbabin, supra note 78, at 494-503.

80.

See Rajan Menon, Pious Words, Puny Deeds: The "International

Community" and Mass Atrocities, 23.3 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 235, 239 (2009) ("Despite
his oft-repeated commitment to human rights, President Carter took a hands-off
position while the Khmer Rouge methodically killed over a quarter of Cambodia's
population between 1975 and 1978.").

81.

Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to

Protect,24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 703, 705 (2006).
In a 1991 speech to Congress, George H.W. Bush said:
82.
Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the
very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a
'world order' in which 'the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the
weak against the strong . . . .' A world where the United Nations, freed from

cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world
in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.
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pronouncement came after the successful completion of the Gulf War
to force Iraq to retreat from its invasion of Kuwait, a war that was
authorized by the UN and led by the United States and the United
Kingdom to force Iraq to retreat from its invasion of Kuwait.8 3
It soon became clear, though, that the end of the Cold War did
not clear the impasse in the Security Council. The 1990s saw a
number of intrastate conflicts erupt, from the former Yugoslavia to
Somalia, and the Security Council proved helpless to stop the
violence. 84 In some instances, force was authorized but the response
was minimal and unhelpful-for example, in Rwanda and Somalia.8 5
In some instances, the Security Council faced internal opposition and
could not act-for example, in Kosovo in 1999.86 In the latter case,
the international community did end up intervening to prevent
further violence between Serbian forces and Albanians, although this
intervention lacked the UN imprimatur and thus faced criticism.8 7

President George H.W. Bush, Address to the U.S. Congress After the Gulf War (Mar. 6,
1991); see also DAVID M. MALONE, THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE OVER IRAQ 67-68,

211-12 (2006) (discussing Bush's remarks and the changed view of the world that they
reflected).
83.
See generally MALONE, supra note 82, at 54-78 (providing a historical
account of the Gulf War).

84.

See generally Rupert Smith, The Security Council and the Bosnian Conflict:

A Practitioners View, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE
EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, supra note 7, at 442, 442-51
(describing the U.N.'s involvement in the 1990s conflict in the Balkans); Susan L.
Woodward, The Security Council and the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE SINCE 1945, supra note 7, at 406, 406-41 (describing the U.N.'s response to
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, and commenting that the U.N.'s involvement in
the conflict "tarnished [its] reputation ... so deeply that many feared it might not
recover").
85.
Estevao Gomes Pinto de Abreu, United Nations and the Use of Force in
Peace Operations: Agenda for Peace Enforcement?, Presentation to the Organizing
Committee of the Joint International Conference ISA-ABRI 2009 2 (July 22, 2009),
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p-mlaapa-researchcitation/3/8/1/0/7/pages381070/
p381070-4.php.
86.
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for
Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc SC/6659
(Mar. 26, 1999).
87.
For a discussion of the legality of the Kosovo intervention, see generally
DAVID CHANDLER, FROM KOSOVO TO KABUL: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION 120-157 (2002) (discussing the challenge of using international law to
deal with human rights issues in situations like Kosovo); Anne-Sophie Massa, NATO's

Intervention in Kosovo and the Decision of the Prosecutorof the InternationalCriminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of
ProsecutorialDiscretion?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 610, 618-26 (2006) (arguing that the
intervention may have been illegal and, furthermore, that NATO may have committed
war crimes in the course of intervening); Nigel S. Rodley & Basak Cali, Kosovo

Revisited: HumanitarianIntervention on the Fault Lines of Internationallaw, 7 HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 275, 279-82 (2007) (reviewing various lines of reasoning that could be used
to classify the intervention as legal or illegal); Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in
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The intervention in Kosovo jump-started a serious debate about
the legality of humanitarian intervention in cases involving severe
violations of human rights on a wide scale.8 8 The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) had conducted the bombing raids on
Serbia because it was obvious that Russia-and perhaps Chinawould have vetoed any attempts to authorize a resolution in favor of
the use of force.89 Some observers, including the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo headed by former South African
Supreme Court Justice Richard Goldstone, believed that the
intervention was clearly illegal under international law because the
UN Charter banned the use of force by states lacking explicit Security
Council authorization.o The Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
itself argued, in a case brought in front of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), that the war could not be legitimized by recourse to the
concept of humanitarian intervention.9 1 Professor Ian Brownlie, a
professor of international law at Oxford University assisting the FRY,
articulated the view thus:
[Tihe overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down
against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention, for three
main reasons: first, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern
international law do not seem specifically to incorporate such a right;
secondly, state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since
1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian
intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on

Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828, 828-31 (1999) (arguing that there was a "lack of any
simple [legal] principle for the air campaign").
See, e.g., Rodley & Cali, supra note 87, at 279-83 (reviewing the arguments
88.
on both sides as to the legality of the NATO intervention).
89.
DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 18, at 940.
90.
The Independent International Commission concluded that the bombing
campaign was "illegal but legitimate." INT'L INDEP. COMM'N ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo
REPORT:

CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL

RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED

4 (2000).

See

Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory HumanitarianIntervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 834, 834 (1999) ("Indisputably, the NATO intervention ... violated the United
Nations Charter and international law."). For a more nuanced view of the illegality of
the intervention, see generally Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 791, 792-93 (1999)
(noting that even though very few states have recognized the legality of the
intervention, many have recognized that it was morally and politically necessary);

Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasuresin the World Community?, 10
EuR. J. INT'L L. 23, 23-24 (1999) [hereinafter Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur] (arguing
that the intervention was contrary to international law but nevertheless necessary
from a moral point of view); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-4 (1999) (noting that "only a thin red line separates
NATO's action from international legality").
91.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. U.S.) (Application Instituting
Proceedings) (filed Apr. 29, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
114/7173.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
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prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues
92
strongly against its creation."

On the other hand, some commentators believed that the NATO
intervention in Kosovo was legal, justified by some combination of
previous Security Council Resolutions regarding Serbia's treatment of
ethnic Albanians, the importance of preventing further humanitarian
catastrophe, and a state of necessity. 93 As State Department
spokesman James Rubin explained, "the Serb side is so far out of line
with accepted norms of international behavior, and the dangers of not
taking preventative action are so great in terms of humanitarian
suffering and further violations of international law that we believe
we have legitimate grounds to act." 94
The prevalent view, however, was that the intervention was
"illegal but legitimate."9 5 The dilemma, concisely stated, was that
intervention was simultaneously a moral imperative and a violation
of the law. Richard Falk thus argued that the intervention was
necessary but impossible: "It was necessary to prevent a
humanitarian catastrophe in the form of ethnic cleansing. It was
impossible because of the political unavailability of an appropriate
means."9 6
In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called this
contradiction in the international legal system into stark relief: "[I]f
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to
gross and systematic violations of human rights . .

. ?"9

Annan

initially answered the question by arguing that the claims of national
sovereignty should be weighed against the claims of individual
sovereignty, but the fundamental dilemma remained.9 8
To meet the challenge laid down by Annan, Canada established
the independent International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty."
Its task was to develop clearer norms to guide

92.
Legality of Use of Force (Yugo. v. Belg.), 1999 I.C.J. Pleadings 14 (May 10,
1999), reprintedin 1986 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 614, 619.
93.
Id.
94.
James P. Rubin, U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 16, 1999),
available at http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1999/99-03-16.std.html.
95.
INT'L INDEP. COMM'N ON Kosovo, supranote 90, at 4.
96.
Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Futureof InternationalLaw,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 852 (1999).
97.
The Secretary-General, Millennium Report of the Secretary-General,We the

People: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, at 48, U.N. Doc A/54/20
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf.
98.
Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, EcONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at
49, 49.
99.
See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, http://www.iciss.calmenu-en.asp
(last visited Mar. 8, 2010) ("The independent International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Government of Canada in
September 2000. . . .").
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decision-makers faced with humanitarian disasters in the future.10 0
After a year of research and discussions, the Commission issued a
report concluding "that sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe-from mass
murder and rape, from starvation-but that when they are unwilling
or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader
community of states."10 1
More particularly, the Commission concluded that any
humanitarian intervention must be for a just cause and must concord
with certain precautionary principles.102
"Just cause" included
interventions to prevent (1) "large scale loss of life" or (2) "large scale
'ethnic cleansing."'10 3 The precautionary principles were (1) right
intention, meaning for the purpose of halting human suffering; (2)
last resort, meaning only after every nonmilitary option had been
explored; (3) proportional means, meaning that the "scale, duration
and intensity of the . . . intervention should be the minimum

necessary to secure the defined human protection objective"; and (4)
reasonable prospects, meaning that there "must be a reasonable
chance of success in halting or averting the suffering." 0 4 The
Commission cited such developments in international law as the
proliferation of human rights accords, changing state practice, and
the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace.105 These developments had elevated individual
rights to a new level of importance in the international system,
resulting in constraints on national sovereignty. 10 6
The Commission's report was followed up by the SecretaryGeneral's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change,
which
embraced
to
a
large
extent
the
Commission's
recommendations.10 7 The Panel stated:
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council
authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of
genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious

100.
See DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 18, at 955.
101.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at
VIII.
102.
Id. at XII.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id. at XI.
106.
See id. at 12 ("[T]he authority of the state is not regarded as absolute, but
constrained and regulated internally by constitutional power sharing arrangements.").
107.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Security-General'sHigh-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
$T2-3, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available
at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.
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violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign
Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. 108

The Panel listed the criteria for intervention as the following:
Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human
security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima
facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it
involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or
serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or
imminently apprehended?
Properpurpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other
purposes or motives may be involved?
Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in
question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that
other measures will not succeed?
Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the
proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in
question?
Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military
action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the
consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of
inaction? 1 0 9

The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as expressed
in the Panel's report, has since received acceptance in the
international community, including the Security Council. In 2005,
the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit of the United
Nations General Assembly explicitly. recognized this duty as a
binding norm of international law. 110
The Security Council
reaffirmed the same principle in a 2006 resolution.'1 1
But,
importantly, the UN has excised references to "serious violations of
international humanitarian law" as imposing a responsibility to
protect on the international community." 2 As the norm stands

108.
109.
110.

Id.

203.
207.
The document states:

Id.

Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. ... In this
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
111.
S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
138-39 (pulling back from the stated
112.
See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 110,
standard).

2010]

FREE SPEECH PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

275

today, then, the UN has only endorsed a responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
The progress from the days when state
against humanity.
sovereignty was considered inviolate is breathtaking, but the
historical arc beginning after World War II and culminating in the
post-Kosovo War period just how logical and necessary the doctrine of
responsibility to protect.

C. Free Speech and the Responsibility to Protect
For hundreds of years, the concept of inviolable state sovereignty
pinned up the international legal regime, allowing states to act with
impunity within their borders-even while constrained outside of
them. But in the post-World War II period, the perceived exigency of
protecting civilians from the predations of their own governments
forced a reconsideration of that time-honored tradition. Beginning
with the Nuremberg trials, then with the UN Charter, and finally
with the numerous human rights treaties signed in the following
years, actors on the international stage began to enshrine the rights
of individuals in international law." 3 These treaties protected a vast
panoply of rights: free speech, freedom from discrimination, freedom
But there remained a disconnect
of movement, and others." 4
between the aspirations of the reformers and state practice: the
treaties only bound states willing to submit themselves to their
obligations, and individuals continued to rely mainly on their own
states to protect their rights." 5 In the 1990s, though, a series of
violent conflicts in various parts of the world such as Rwanda,
Somalia, and Yugoslavia led many states to conclude that the current
legal regime designed to protect the rights of individuals was
flawed.11 6 Morality conflicted with law, and pressure built for the
main actors to resolve the tension. Thus, the UN adopted the
doctrine of a responsibility to protect: states had an affirmative duty
to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity, and if they failed in this duty, it fell
7
upon the international community to step in and do it for them."

MAHONEY, supra note 11, at 42-53.
113.
UDHR, supranote 4, arts. 7, 13.
114.
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L &
115.
COMP. L. 31, 40 (1995).
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at
116.

1-2; see also Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies In Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and
Liberia-Revisitingthe Validity of HumanitarianIntervention Under InternationalLaw
(pt. 2), 26 DENV. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 827, 830 n.15 (1998) (noting the United States'
reaction following the crises).
See generally INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
117.
supra note 8, at XI-XIII (outlining the tenets and duties of the new intervention
doctrine).
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Unfortunately, this development has only created another
internal contradiction: the world community's commitment to protect
individuals from mass murder has betrayed the broader promise of
the post-World War II period to grant individuals a wide range of
rights under the international legal system. So, today, the UN and
the world's most powerful states have promised to intervene to
protect the right to life in some limited-if admittedly extremecases, but they have reneged on the assurances of the multitudes of
human rights treaties to protect other basic individual rights. 1 8 This
contradiction is striking because the justifications for the
responsibility to protect apply just as strongly, if not more, in respect
to many of the other rights not included as justifications for
intervention. Part III thus discusses the most storied "first freedom,"
the freedom of expression, in light of the creation of the emerging
norm of a responsibility to protect.
III. THE

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. HistoricalOrigins
The concept of an individual right to free speech dates back at
least to Athens and the writings of Plato and Euripides.1 9 Milton's
translation of Euripides' play, The Suppliants, for example, contains
these lines:
This is true Liberty when free born men
Having to advise the public may speak free,
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise,
Who neither can nor will, may hold his peace;
What can be juster in a State than this?

120

Looking beyond the Western world, an individual's right to freedom of
expression was also recognized in the Muslim world.121 But despite a

118.
See, e.g., Roger Cohen, The Making of an Iran Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02Iran-t.html (noting the Obama
administration's decision not to intervene in the post-election government crackdown);
Nicholas Kristof, Sneaking in Where Thugs Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/opinion/05kristof.html
(detailing
unchecked
human rights abuses in Myanmar); Edward Wong, China Rebuffs Clinton on Internet
Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/worldlasial
23diplo.html (commenting on one form of China's free speech abuses).
119.
ROBERT HARGREAVES, THE FIRST FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH 49 (2002) (describing the free speech enjoyed by Athenians at this time).
120.
EURIPIDES, THE SUPPLIANTS (11.438-441), translated in JOHN MILTON,
AEROPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in THE OXFORD AUTHORS: JOHN MILTON 236, 237
(Stephen Orgel & Jonathan Goldberg eds., 1991).
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long line of distinguished supporters of the freedom of expression,122
it was not until 1789 that free speech was first incorporated in a
country's bill of rights. 2 3 In The Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the Citizen, the National Assembly of France declared that "the
free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious
of the rights of man."124
Then, in 1791, the United States
Constitution, in its First Amendment, stated that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or

the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."125
Since then, an
individual's right to freedom of speech has become accepted in
countries around the world.126
When individual rights started to appear in international
treaties after World War II, the freedom of expression was, without
fail, included in the lists of fundamental rights.' 2 7 A vast array of
international and regional instruments set out the basic human
rights that all individuals were entitled to, and each described the
rights in slightly different fashions. A brief look at the variety of
treaties will give a better understanding of the importance that
freedom of speech bears in international law.

121.
In the seventh century, the caliph Omar pronounced, "Only decide on the
basis of proof, be kind to the weak so that they can express themselves freely and
without fear, deal on an equal footing with litigants by trying to reconcile them."
Marcel A. Broisard, On the Probable Influence of Islam on Western Public and
InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 429, 440 (1980).

122.

So, in 1516, Erasmus, in his Education of a ChristianPrince, says, "In a

free state, tongues too should be free." DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, THE EDUCATION OF A

CHRISTIAN PRINCE 232 (Lisa Jardine ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1516).
Likewise, John Milton, in his famous tract, Areopagitica,argued against restrictions on
the press. John Milton, supra note 120, at 237-73.
123.
The French document, The Declaration of the Rights of Man, was the first
document positing that all individuals possessed a right to freedom of expression. In
1689, the English Bill of Rights, adopted after William and Mary overthrew James II,
contained provisions granting freedom of speech in Parliament. Official Website of the
British Monarchy, History of the Monarchy: The Stuarts-Mary II and William III,
http://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/KingsandQueensoftheUnitedKingdom/
(last
TheStuarts/MaryllWilliamIllandTheActofSettlement/MaryIIWilliamIII.aspx
visited Mar. 8, 2010).
1789 Declaration des droits de I'Homme et du citoyen [Declaration of the
124.
Rights of Man and of the Citizen] art. 11. The Declaration is incorporated into France's
current constitution. 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.).
125.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS126.
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, at xiv

(2006) ("Virtually all constitutional democracies purport to respect the freedom of
speech. . ."); see also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and InternationalNorms:
A Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 57 (1992) (stating that freedom of
speech "is recognized throughout the world as an essential component of a just
society").
127.
See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 4, pmbl.
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B. InternationalInstruments ConcerningFree Speech
1.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The UN Human Rights Commission, formed in 1946 in the
aftermath of World War II, had the express purpose of preparing an
international bill of rights that would describe the human rights
component of the UN Charter.128 Unsure whether to prepare a
declaration or a treaty, it decided to do both: first, a nonbinding
declaration, and then a binding convention. 29 In 1948, the General
Assembly adopted the Commission's declaration, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.13 0 The Universal Declaration sets out
individuals' basic civil and political rights, including the rights to life,
security of one's person, fair trial, freedom of movement, and freedom
of religion and expression.13 1 With respect to free speech, the
Universal Declaration provides, "Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."1 32 This right is
not absolute, though. According to the Universal Declaration,
countries may place restrictions "solely for the purpose of securing. . .
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society."'
The Universal Declaration, as an international instrument, has
had an unprecedented level of influence on international norms and
state practice. While the Declaration was considered nonbinding by
some countries when it was adopted, 3 4 it was generally understood
as being truly universal.135 Indeed, the Universal Declaration has
achieved such widespread acceptance that one commentator has
stated that it has "become a part of the common law of the world

128.

DUNOFF, RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 18, at 446.

129.

Id.; see also Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 32, 32-33 (Louis Henkin
ed., 1981) (discussing the buckpassing of the U.N. Charter to subsequent enforceable
arrangements).
130.
UDHR, supra note 4.
131.
Id. pmbl., art 1.
132.
Id. art. 19.
133.
Id. art. 29.
134.
Saudi Arabia protested against the articles in the Declaration declaring
equal marriage rights and the right to change one's religion or beliefs. DUNOFF,
RATNER & WIPPMAN, supra note 18, at 447.

135.

The Secretary General, United Nations Action in the Field of Human

Rights, 67, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2/Rev.2 (1983) ("[The Universal Declaration] is, as its
title implies, truly universal in its application and applies to every member of the
human family, everywhere, regardless of whether or not his Government accepts its
principles or ratifies the Covenants . . . .")

2010]

FREE SPEECH PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

279

community; and, together with the Charter of the United Nations, it
has achieved the character of the world law superior to all other
international instruments and to domestic laws." 136 Many countries
have incorporated the document into their own constitutions,1 7 and
many more have based their constitutions' bill of rights on the
protections enumerated in the Declaration.1 3 8
2.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Pressed to complete an international bill of rights, the Human
Rights Commission decided to draft a binding covenant in addition to
the aspirational Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The result,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
shared many of the provisions included in the Declaration but
elaborated more fully on them. The ICCPR also included a (limited)
mechanism for hearing complaints from individuals regarding
violations of the treaty. 139
Again, freedom of expression held an exalted position in the
demarcation of rights. According to the ICCPR, the right to hold
opinions "without interference" was absolute. 140 No restrictions for
any reason were permitted. 141 In addition, freedom of expression
included the "freedom to seek, receive and impart information of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice." 142 The
positive content of the freedom of expression was limited by "special
duties and responsibilities." 143 Therefore, the exercise of the freedom
of expression could be subject to restrictions that were necessary (1)
"for respect of the rights or reputations of others" or (2) "for the
protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or
The individual right of freedom of expression was
morals." 144

136.
Louis B. Sohn, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L
COMMISSION JURISTS 17, 26 (1967).
137.
Countries such as Algeria, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, and Cameroon
have incorporated substantial parts of the Declaration. JAMES AVERY JOYCE, HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 146 (1978).
Most Caribbean countries base their constitutional instruments on the
138.

UDHR. Stephen Vasciannie, Human Rights in the Caribbean:Notes on Perception and
Reality, in THE CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS: A PEOPLE CENTERED APPROACH
167, 168 (Kenneth Hall ed., 2007).
ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 41.
139.
140.
Id. art. 19.
141.
Id.
142.
Id. art. 19, para. 2.
143.
Id. art. 19, para. 3.
144.
Id.
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protected not just from governmental action but also from the actions
of individuals.1 4 5
The inclusion of a reference to "special duties and
responsibilities" accompanying the exercise of the freedom of
expression was a controversial proposition.14 6 Countries supporting
the inclusion of such a clause argued that free speech was a "precious
heritage" that held tremendous power in public opinion and
international affairs, thus justifying reference to the responsibilities
of speakers.1 47 But other states, including the United States, argued
that all rights carry countervailing duties, and thus any specific
reference to the duties inherent to free speech was unnecessary.148 In
the end, consensus was reached on a clause that provided for special
duties and responsibilities but narrowly limited the kinds of
restrictions that could be imposed on the right.149 The resulting
definition of the right to freedom of expression was surprisingly
broad, given the difficulty of getting so many divergent countries to
agree on one version.15 0
3.

Convention for the Protection
Fundamental Freedoms

of

Human

Rights

and

In the period immediately after the adoption of the Universal
Declaration in 1948, many commentators in Europe worried that a
binding treaty regarding international human rights would be
difficult if not impossible under the auspices of the UN.' 5 ' Driven by
the revulsion towards the recently perpetrated abuses of the Nazi
regime, the Council of Europe drafted a Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European
Convention) designed to make the promises of the Universal

145.
See Defeis, supra note 126, at 79 (noting the dually restrictive outcome of
the speech limitation debate).
146.
See MARC J. BOssuYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 379 (1987) (noting debate
over the proposal).
147.
Id. at 393. Some states even argued for limitations on expressions that are
obscene and expressions that defame the reputations of others. These limitations were
not included in the final draft. Id. at 387.
148.
Id. at 386.
149.
Id. at 386-87.
150.
Today, 162 countries have ratified the convention. The Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights keeps a full list of parties to the ICCPR. United
Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-4&chapter=
4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
151.
Defeis, supra note 126, at 94.
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Declaration binding on its member states. 152 Today, the European
Convention stands as the most successful and robust system to
protect human rights in the world.
The European Convention created two bodies, the European
Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights, to ensure that member states comply with their
obligations.153 An optional protocol empowers individuals to petition
the Commission directly for any alleged violation of their rights under
the European Convention. 154
The European Convention's provisions regarding freedom of
speech are naturally very similar to those provisions in the ICCPR
because both documents are based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.15 5 The one exception is the inclusion of a long list of
limitations on the freedom of expression in the European Convention.
Article 10 of the European Convention states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers....
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
15 6
judiciary.

The extensive list of restrictions on an individual's right to exercise
his freedom of speech stems from the fewer number of participants in
the negotiations and the consequently higher level of consensus

152.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 10, para. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22 [hereinafter European
Convention].
153.
Id. art. 19.
154.
All twenty-two members of the Council of Europe have adopted the optional
protocol. See MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 22-32
(1990) (providing a history of formation of the protocol).
155.
Compare European Convention, supra note 152, art. 10 ("Everyone has the
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 6pinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers.") with ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
156.

European Convention, supra note 152, art. 10.

282

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 431255

between member states as compared to the ICCPR.' 5 7 The temporal
and geographical closeness of the war created a stronger unity in
Europe with respect to this issue.15 8 The United States itself would
not go so far. Indeed, in the ICCPR negotiations the United States
was one of the most active proponents of a relatively unrestricted
freedom of speech, for the reason that its own jurisprudence was
consistent with such a view.15 9
4.

American Convention on Human Rights

In 1948, twenty-one countries in Latin America joined together
to defend their territorial integrity and promote peace and justice
under the Organization of American States.160 In the same year, a
few months before the UN adopted the Universal Declaration, they
adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man.16 1 Just as with the Universal Declaration, a subsequent
document, the American Convention on Human Rights elaborates
upon the extent of the obligations provided for in the American
Declaration. 162
The American Convention, like the European
Convention, set up an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
to review alleged human rights violations and an Inter-American
Court of Human Rights to hear appeals.163

157.
See Defeis, supra note 126, at 94 (noting a policymaking stalemate).
158.
See id. (noting the immediate backdrop of the human rights abuses of
WWII).
159.
A huge literature exists on the conflict between United States free speech
law and free speech law in the rest of the world. For comparative commentary on
various bodies of speech law, see id. (discussing the impact of international norms on
hate speech); Claudia E. Haupt, Regulating Hate Speech-Damned if You Do and
Damned if You Don't: Lessons Learned from Comparing the German and U.S.
Approaches, 23 B.U. INT'L L. J. 299 (2005) (providing a comparison of U.S. and German
approaches to free speech protections; Krotoszynski, supra note 126 (comparing speech
law); Ziyad Motala, The First Amendment and Hate Speech: An Illustrationof Why the
United States Supreme Court's Approach Represents an Anomaly, 46 How. L.J. 507
(2003) (discussing the U.S. approach to hate speech and how it represents an anomaly
in the international community); Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The
United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377 (2006)
(reviewing U.S. free speech protections and comparing them with those found in the
rest of the world).
160.
Organization of American States Charter, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter OAS Charter].
161.
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American
Convention].
162.

Id.

163.

Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System for Protection of Human

Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL POLICY ISSUES 439, 460-67

(Theodore Meron ed., 1984); Thomas Buergenthal, Human Rights in the Americas:
View From the Inter-American Court, 2 CONN J. INVL L. 303, 306-09 (1987).
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The right to freedom of expression contained in the American
Convention is almost identical to that found in the International
Covenant. 164 Article 13 of the American Convention states that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought and expression."165 It
also prohibits indirect methods of restricting expression, such as
unfair allocation of newsprint or broadcasting frequencies, a
restriction that applies both to private persons as well as the
government.16 6 On the other hand, it requires states to prohibit war
propaganda and advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred.167
The American Convention's free speech clauses are the most farreaching of any human rights treaty.168 Indeed, the American Court
has articulated the view that the American Convention's guarantees
of freedom of expression are "more generous" than those guaranteed
in the European Convention.169 The treaty's provisions with regard
to free speech evince an intent to reduce to the absolute minimum
restrictions on the free exercise of speech. 7 0
5.

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

Until 1986, African countries adhered to the doctrine of noninterference with the internal affairs of other member states of the
Organization for African Unity (OAU).171 But in response to serious
human rights abuses in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as
Tanzania's invasion of Uganda, the OAU decided to draft an African

164.
Compare American Convention, supra note 161, art. 13 ("Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's
choice.") with ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19 ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice.").
165.
American Convention, supra note 161, art. 13, para. 1.
166.
Id. art. 13, para. 3.
167.
Id. art. 13, para. 5.
168.
Notably, the American Convention has several features that go beyond
other human rights instruments. For one, the American Convention explicitly states
that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression "shall not be subject to prior
censorship." See GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, REGARDLESS OF FRONTIERS
(1998), available at http://gilc.org/speecb/report/. The rule against prior censorship is
also reinforced by Article 14, which provides for a right of reply by anyone inured by
inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the general public. See id.
169.
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 & 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Adv. Op. OC5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 5,
50 (Nov. 13, 1985), available at
httpJ/wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/iachr/b_11_4e.htm.
170.
1985 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 1176.

171.

Ziyad Motala, Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological, and Legal

Examination, 12 HASTINGS INTL & COMP. L. REV. 373, 396 (1989).
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Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to promote individual and
group rights in Africa. 172
The Charter establishes a framework for protection of human
rights that is generally considered weaker than the frameworks of
other comparable human rights treaties. 73 True, the Charter creates
a Commission "to promote human and peoples' rights and ensure
their protection in Africa."1 74 But the Commission's investigations of
violations of the treaty must be confidential unless authorized by the
Assembly of Heads of State of the OAU. 75 A former Secretary
General of the OAU has described the Commission as "far from being
an organ with jurisdiction for protection of human rights."176 The
Charter also contained no provision for a court of human rights.
Instead, it opted for mediation, consensus, and conciliation, in order
to conform with African customs and practices.' 77 In 2004, however,
an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights was formed to rule
on compliance with the African Charter. 7 8 It has had limited
success. 179
The Charter guarantees every individual's right "to receive
information" and "to express and disseminate his opinions within the
law." 80 It does not have any express reference to restrictions on the
right of free expression, although it is subject to the general
restrictions set forth later in the document, which clarify that
individuals must exercise their freedoms "with due regard to the
rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest."181

172.
Id.; B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the
European and American Systems, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 141,144 (1984).
173.
Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43, 43 (1992).
174.
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 30, June 27, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 58, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, 21 I.L.M. 58
[hereinafter African Charter].
175.
Id. art. 59.
176.
Edem Kodjo, The African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights, 11 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 271, 279 (1990).
177.
Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison
and Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 585, 611 (1987).
178.
Rebecca Wright, Findingan Impetus for Institutional Change at the African
Court for Human and Peoples'Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 463, 476 (2006).
179.
See id. (showing the development of the court from a rational design theory
perspective).
180.
African Charter, supra note 174, art. 9.
181.
Id. art. 27.
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C. The InternationalLaw on Free Speech as
Expressed by InternationalTreaties
The number of international and regional legal instruments
protecting the freedom of speech demonstrate just how established
that right is as an international norm. While the treaties each
express the right in a slightly different way, there are some basic
concepts to which all ascribe. Together, the treaties cover the
overwhelming majority of the world's countries and therefore have
vast importance for the explanation of any truly universal right to
freedom of speech.
Countries ratifying any of the abovementioned human rights
treaties accept two obligations: (1) to adopt statutes or other
measures necessary to protect the rights guaranteed by the treaty
and (2) to remedy any violations of the rights.1 82 The ability of
individuals to petition for redress of violations, however, varies
significantly. The European Convention provides a robust system for
individual complaints, while the ICCPR contains none, except in the
Optional Protocol.1 83
The content of the guarantee of the freedom of expression in the
various treaties is, for the most part, relatively uniform. An
individual right to hold opinions without interference is declared by
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, and
the American and European Conventions are understood to protect
the right as well. 184 The African Charter makes no mention of the
right. 8 5 The right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
is explicitly provided for in the Universal Declaration, the
International Covenant, and the American Convention.186 Both the
European Convention and the African Charter are assumed to protect
this right as well.' 8 7
All the treaties also establish a test for determining the
legitimacy of restrictions on the freedom of speech. They generally
require that any restriction must (1) be provided by law; (2) serve one
of the legitimate purposes enumerated in their texts; and (3) be
necessary.1 8 8 Although some of the treaties detail the legitimate

182.
INT'L CTR. AGAINST CENSORSHIP, THE ARTICLE 19 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
HANDBOOK: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 15
(1993).
183.
Id. at 224-25, 226.
184.
Id. at 15.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id. at 15-16.
188.
Id. at 16.
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reasons for restrictions with greater specificity,18 9 all provide some
variation on the themes of respect for the rights of others, public
order, and morals. 19 0
International treaties thus show substantial consensus on the
broad contours of the individual right to freedom of expression. The
Universal Declaration provides the most widely accepted articulation
of that freedom, achieving the status of "world law superior to all
other international instruments and to domestic laws." 19 Regional
treaties have tweaked the individual right, but for the most part they
have reaffirmed the concept. The problem, though, lies in
implementation.
Other than the European Convention, the
mechanisms for enforcing the obligations of states under the treaties
are faulty or non-existent. The ICCPR, which elaborates on the
meaning of the Universal Declaration, is enforceable only to the
extent that states ratify the Optional Protocol, and even then is of
questionable value.192 The African Charter created no court of
human rights, and such a court was formed only in 2004.193 The
American Convention does have a court, but its duties are limited

189.
For example, the European Convention states that it does "not prevent
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises."
European Convention, supranote 152, art. 10.
190.
The UDHR, supra note 4, art. 29, para. 2, permits restrictions on the
freedom of speech to secure "due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and . .. the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare. . . ." The ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19, para. 3(b), permits restrictions to
protect "the rights or reputations of others," national security, public order, and "public
health or morals." The American Convention, supra note 161, art. 13, uses the same
language as the ICCPR. The European Convention, supra note 152, art. 10, allows
restrictions to protect "national security, territorial integrity or public safety," health,
morals, the rights of others, and the impartiality of the judiciary, as well as to prevent
disorder or the disclosure of confidential information. The African Charter, supra note
174, art. 27, permits restrictions to protect "the rights of others, collective security,
morality, and common interest."
191.
Sohn, supra note 136, at 26.
192.
The experience of Sri Lanka is illustrative. Sri Lanka acceded to the ICCPR
in 1980 and the Optional Protocol in 1997. Sri Lanka's Supreme Court Decision
Undermines Human Rights Protection,REFWORLD, Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.fidh.org/
spip.php? article3731. But in 2006, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court issued a decision
stating that "the [ICCPR] does not have internal effect and the rights under the ICCPR
are not rights under the law of Sri Lanka." Singarasa v. Attorney General, [2006] SC
(SPL) L.A. No. 182/99, at *7 (Sri Lanka). As for the Optional Protocol, the Court held
that its ratification was unconstitutional and thus individuals "cannot seek to
'vindicate and enforce' [their] rights through the [Human Rights Committee]." Id. at *6.
In a case later that year, when a plaintiff complained that the Supreme Court was the
final court of appeals, the Chief Justice jokingly responded, "Well, try the Optional
Protocol," and laughed. Press Release, Asian Human Rights Comm'n, Sri Lanka: The
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is Openly Subjected to Ridicule by Sarath N. Silva, the
Chief Justice, (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.ahrchk.net/pr/mainfile.php/
2006mr/398/.
193.
Wright, supra note 178, at 476.

2010]

FREE SPEECH PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

287

and its ability to hear cases is entirely dependent on the decision of a
separate commission. 194
So, the human rights treaties make a number of promises to
individuals about their right to free speech, but they provide scant
means of enforcement. And without enforcement, the impressive
guarantees made by human rights instruments lose much of their
force. States that do not expect to have their commitments enforced
on them feel free to make them willy nilly.s9 5 If that is true, then
how can one close the gap between rights and remedies in
international law? The next Part will address precisely this question.
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, SOVEREIGNTY, AND FREE SPEECH
Returning to the issue of state sovereignty, the exclusion of free
speech, among other fundamental rights codified in international
treaties of the twentieth century, from the pantheon of rights, the
violation of which called for the intervention of the international
community, was reminiscent of the pre-World War II period, in which
states were the primary--even sole-actors in international affairs
and international law. Indeed, the position of the General Assembly
and the Security Council, with respect to the violation of individual
rights not involving genocide and crimes against humanity, seems to
wholeheartedly affirm the position of Yugoslavia in 1999 that "[n]o
State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State."196 While the ICJ dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction and thus did not address the merits of Yugoslavia's
position, that position is by now nearly universally discredited.

194.
See Morse H. Tan, Upholding Human Rights in the Hemisphere: Casting
Down Impunity Through the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J.
243, 277-84 (2008) (explaining the referral system and describing the Court's previous
lack of effectiveness).

195.

See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111

YALE L.J. 1935, 1962-89 (2002) (a quantitative study to determine whether states act
in their own self-interest with respect to their attitude on human rights law); Oona A.

Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 588, 592 (2007) (arguing that "the effect of a treaty on a state-and hence the
state's willingness to commit to it - is largely determined by the domestic enforcement
of the treaty and the treaty's collateral consequences.").
196.
OAS Charter, supra note 161, art. 15 ("No State or group of States has the
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or
external affairs of any other State."); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX),
1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/20/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965) ("No
State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State.").
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The essential problem with the pre-World War II legal regime
was that it acknowledged state sovereignty as the building block of
international relations and therefore treated it as inviolable. This
system left individual citizens at the whim of their governments, only
able to enforce their rights to the extent that the state considered
appropriate.' 9 7 Even after the proliferation of human rights treaties
delineating the rights of individuals under international law, the
inviolability of state sovereignty remained a tenet of the law of
nations. For example, in the famous case of Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the act of state
doctrine, by which the decisions of foreign countries relating to their
internal affairs would not be questioned.1 98 The court explained as
follows:
Because of [international law's] peculiar nation-to-nation character the
usual method for an individual to seek relief is to exhaust local
remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of his own state
to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before an
international tribunal. 199

And this redefining of international law's peculiar nation-to-nation
character-giving the state the principal role in global discoursewas crucial to the pre-World War II era. 200 Any interference with the
internal affairs of states was seen as illegal and unnecessary
meddling. Foreign intervention, even by a group of states, was a
violation of the baseline rule of inviolable state sovereignty, at least
as far as it concerned intrastate conflict.
As the historical discussion above makes clear, however, this line
of thought became unsustainable after World War II, when the full
extent of the horrors of the Holocaust became clear. The atrocities
committed by the Nazi regime on its own citizens shocked the
conscience of the world and demanded a rethinking of the
fundamental contours of the previous legal system. Thus, in treaty
after treaty, nation states agreed that individual rights were an
important component of international law. 20 1 With the relatively
recent development of a responsibility to protect individuals from
certain severe crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity,
legal scholars and international organizations have paved the way for

197.
See LEVI, supra note 23, at 181.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964).
198.
199.
Id. at 422-23.
200.
See id. at 408-09 (citing cases permitting sovereign states to sue in the
courts of the United States).
201.
See LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY (2007); MICHELINE
R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE
GLOBALIZATION ERA 173-229 (2004) (tracing the history of human rights); MAHONEY,
supra note 11, at 42-64 (examining the treaties of the modern human rights
movement).
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a more morally intuitive approach towards evaluating the legality of
intervention. The right of state sovereignty had to be balanced
against the competing claims of individuals to their own rights. Kofi
Annan, writing in 1999, described the situation as follows:
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not least
by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are
now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples,
and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty-by which
I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the
charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties-has been
enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual
rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever
conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to
202
protect those who abuse them.

This view of the concept of state sovereignty was explicitly adopted
both by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, giving it
full recognition in international law.20 3
In its core assumptions, the international legal system's
treatment of free speech is eerily similar to the pre-World War II
treatment of internal affairs. Take, for example, the case of Tibet.
Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch have
documented widespread violations of free speech: thousands of
Tibetans have been sent to prison for exercising the freedom of
expression concerning Tibetan independence, freedom to profess one's
204
religion has been severely limited, and other violations abound.
But when the Chinese government was confronted with criticism of
its treatment of Tibetans, it responded with a typical state
sovereignty argument:
What happens in Tibet is an internal affair of China. The Chinese
Government resolutely opposes any interference in the Tibet issue,
which is our internal affair. We urge relevant countries to respect
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect the universally
recognized norms governing international relations, and do not support
the Dalai Clique's separatist activities in any form under any excuse. I
would like to stress that the Chinese Government has the

202.

Annan, supra note 98, at 49.

203.

See Emma McClean, The Responsibility to Protect:The Role of International

Human Rights Law, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 123, 128-29 (2008) (showing Annan's
influential role in the development of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility
to protect, ultimately adapted by the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit).
See TIBET SINCE 1950: SILENCE, PRISON OR EXILE 30-175 (Melissa Harris &
204.
Sidney Jones eds., 2000) (photo-history of human rights violations in Tibet since 1950);

Laura S. Ziemer, Application in Tibet of the Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 233, 234-38 (2001) (connecting human rights
standards and the environment in Tibet); Amnesty International, Our Statement to
U.N. Human Rights Council regarding Tibet (Mar. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.amnesty.org.aulnews/ comments/11342/ (calling on the Human Rights
Council to address the human rights situation in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and
in the neighboring provinces which have experienced unrest).
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Therefore, the language of inviolable state sovereignty still holds
traction in international legal discourse. For this reason, China saw
intervention to prevent violations of the numerous fundamental
rights guaranteed by binding international treaties as a violation of
the more important international norm of sovereignty and noninterference. Indeed, the Chinese position does appear to be an
accurate restatement of the current state of the law. While the
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions with regard to
genocide and ethnic cleansing established a new international norm
with respect to those very limited circumstances, the position of free
speech in the international system remains subordinate to state
sovereignty. Just as the execution of a state's own citizens once was
considered an internal matter not warranting international concern,
so too the freedom of expression now stands an internal matter not
brooking any kind of foreign meddling.
Under the current understanding of the international law of free
speech and the previous understanding of genocide and ethnic
cleansing, the old fundamental tenet of the law of nations, state
sovereignty, remains alive: the state has exclusive control over its
territory and people. 206 But the assumptions underlying that concept
have eroded since World War II, and it has become clear that the
state owes certain obligations to its citizens. 207 A world that
demands respect for human rights, including within the borders of a
state, cannot coexist with a world that demands absolute respect for
state sovereignty. 208 Despite all the advantages (i.e., stability,
clarity, and national security) of sovereignty, the nonintervention
principle is legitimately subject to certain exceptions-at least to a
limited extent-if the purpose of intervention is for just reasons and
sufficient benefits are expected to accrue from it. 209 This, at least, is
the dominant theory of the post-World War II era. What is not
sufficiently realized today, but what is undeniably valid, is that this
logic applies equally to both interventions to protect populations from

205.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Chinese
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 27,
2008, (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/
t419160.htm.

206.

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 107,

1 29.

207.
See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8,
at 12 (an international survey of opinions on the moral, legal, operational, and political
questions related to humanitarian intervention); A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, supra note 107, $T 183-209 (outlining a system of international
collective security); Annan, supra note 98, at 49 (arguing for international
humanitarian intervention despite state sovereignty).
208.
Annan, supra note 98, at 49.
209.
Id.
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widespread violations of their right to free expression and
interventions to protect from genocide. Here, as elsewhere, human
rights treaties have guaranteed to the people of the world certain
rights-rights that now form part of the nucleus of international
law. 210 The respect for state sovereignty does not trump these rights
any more in the area of free speech than in the area of genocide.
Indeed, if one looks to the rationales for state sovereignty, one sees
that respect for free speech and other human rights embodied in the
multitude of human rights treaties serves these purposes better.
The lack of any intervention norm with regards to speech is to a
certain extent even more surprising than the previous position of
international law with regard to crimes against humanity. Free
speech is one of the oldest and most respected rights in the history of
civilization, one that is often referred to as the "first freedom."21 1 A
long and respected jurisprudence protecting citizens' right to freedom
of expression exists in almost every state. Efforts to protect free
speech require relatively less commitment than efforts to protect
populations from forceful and determined military actions.
International intervention to preserve individuals' free speech rights
should not be regarded as an impermissible interference or an assault
on state sovereignty.
The foundations of the concept of state
sovereignty have eroded since World War II, and the power of states
within their own borders is constantly changing. In some ways,
globalization has expanded the power of states to express their
message and monitor their citizens. In others, it has disassembled
the very idea of a sovereign country. 212 In any case, a system that

210.
But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-44 (2005) (using state interest to explain the realities of
international law); JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005) (arguing that American presidents have the
power to act decisively on the world stage without a declaration of war); Curtis A.
Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1104-07
(1999) (describing a "new" view of American foreign affairs law); Curtis A. Bradley &

Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique
of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870-73 (1997) (arguing that customary
international law, including human rights law, should not have the status of federal
law in the United States). For a discussion of how America's participation in
international institutions is threatened by a vocal group of intellectuals seeking to
guard U.S. sovereignty at all costs, see Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American
Exceptionalismand Its FalseProphets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9, 9-15.
211.
See ROBERT HARGREAVES, THE FIRST FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF FREE
SPEECH 1-22 (2002) (describing protections of the freedom of speech since the times of
the Ancient Greeks).

212.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, DisaggregatedSovereignty: Towards the Public
Accountability of Global Government Networks, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 35, 35-66 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2005)
(contending that, in the face of globalization, the representatives of sovereign nations
must be directly accountable); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks,

Global Information Agencies, and DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT. L. 1041,
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promises "universal" respect for human rights cannot simultaneously
posit that state sovereignty stands as a higher value than those
rights. The international community's responsibility to protect must
encompass not just the protection of a limited selection of individual
rights but also the wide range of fundamental rights guaranteed by
international human rights treaties.
V. RATIONALES FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The responsibility to protect as a doctrine in international law
has developed in fits and starts. Its primary proponents, including
the UN, have used a miscellany of justifications without properly
identifying how each applies. 2 13 Scholars have generally approached
the question using the lens of policy analysis and thus have muddied
the waters. 214 In general, though, arguments in favor of and against
the adoption of a responsibility to protect in international law fall
Moral
into three categories: moral, legal, and consequential.
arguments about the responsibility to protect tend to focus on the
deontological obligations of the international community towards
individuals subject to violations of their rights. 2 15 In other words, it
would be wrong for the international community not to intervene
when a state is engaged in a campaign of genocide against a portion
of its population. Legal arguments, on the other hand, look at the UN
Charter, subsequent human rights treaties, and interpretations of
international law to argue that states have a legal duty to intervene
in certain situations. 2 16 Any such arguments have to confront the
interminable problem of the UN Charter's outlawing of the use of
force outside of self-defense. 2 17 Finally, consequential arguments
1066-73 (2003) (arguing that, rather than having a world state, disaggregated nations
in a post-globalization world must work together to create accountable global
government networks and global information agencies).
213.
The two founding documents of the responsibility to protect doctrine in
international law are the ICISS's The Responsibility to Protect and the High-level
Panel's A More Secure World, never enumerate the rationales underlying their policy
recommendations.
See generally INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra
note 107.
214.
For example, a classic explanation of the dilemma of humanitarian
intervention, Richard Falk's Kosovo, World Order, and the Futureof InternationalLaw,
mixes legal and moral arguments without clearly delineating where one ends and
where the other begins. He concludes that intervention in Kosovo was "necessary to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe . . . [but] impossible because of the political
unavailability of an appropriate means." Falk, supra note 96, at 852. What is
impossible is finding out what he means by "necessary" and "impossible."
215.
Id. at 852-53.
216.
Id. at 854-56.
217.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
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tend to focus on the bad results that would occur if the international
community did not intervene in cases of genocide, crimes against
Such bad results range from
humanity, or ethnic cleansing.
spreading instability, to excessive human suffering, to a breakdown of
international law.
Moral
Inevitably, these arguments tend to run together.
arguments about the need to intervene usually consider the effects of
Legal arguments have to look both at
not intervening. 2 18
international norms and at consequences. Indeed, the two most
important documents describing the international doctrine of
responsibility to protect seem to use all three justifications. 219 But
this Part will attempt to look at the various justifications in turn and
separately in order to flesh out the assumptions underlying the
concept of a responsibility to protect. Only after doing so can one
begin to understand the compelling need for a broader concept of a
responsibility to protect--one that, at a bare minimum, includes the
protection of the freedom of speech.

A. Moral Arguments for the Responsibility to Protect
States, international organizations, and scholars of international
law have deployed a wide variety of moral arguments to justify the
adoption of a responsibility to protect, and it is beyond the scope of
this Article to consider all of them. 220 However, in recent years, three

political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."); id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.").
See, e.g., Falk, supra note 96, at 852-53 (noting the disastrous
218.
consequences that would occur in the event of non-intervention).
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at
219.
17-43.
XI-XIII; A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,supra note 107,
See HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
220.
DILEMMAS 91-174 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane, eds., 2004) (discussing the
context, ethics, law, and politics of humanitarian intervention); FERNANDO R. TES)N,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 3-18 (2d. ed.
1997) (arguing that the rights of states derive from human rights and consequently
wars in defense of human rights are just); Mirko Bagaric & John R. Morss,
Transforming HumanitarianIntervention from an Expedient Accident to a Categorical
Imperative, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 421, 423 (2005) ("[Alltruism needs to be established in
an administrative manner."); Gareth Evans, From HumanitarianIntervention to the
Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 703, 704-12 (2006) (discussing the
development of "the responsibility to protect"); Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian
Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 107 (2006) ("contend[ing]
that legalizing UHI [unilateral humanitarian intervention] should in important
respects discouragewars with ulterior motives"); Thomas H. Lee, The Augustinian Just
War Tradition and the Problem of Pretext in HumanitarianIntervention, 28 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 756, 757-62 (2005) (attempting to show how the present laws of war might be
viewed as consistent with the Augustinian just war tradition); James W. Smith III,
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leading accounts of the morality of intervention have emerged. They
are (1) the higher moral value placed on individual rights than on
state integrity; (2) John Rawls's argument in favor of an international
law of well-ordered peoples; and (3) Michael Walzer's appeal to the
virtue of communal autonomy.
First, some commentators argue that individual rights take
moral precedence over any right of states to nonintervention. 221 Kofi
Annan has expressed this viewpoint, stating that "even harder
experience has led us to grapple with the fact that no legal
principle-not even sovereignty-should ever be allowed to shield
genocide, crimes against humanity and mass human suffering."222
Indeed, the international law scholar Fernando Tes6n begins with the
proposition that, from an "ethical standpoint," governments are solely
agents of their people and "[those governments'] international rights
derive from the rights of the individuals who inhabit and constitute
the state."223 Thus, when a government violates the rights of its
citizens, it ceases to hold a legitimate claim to respect of its territorial
integrity.
A second line of thought is espoused by John Rawls in his book
The Law of Peoples, in which he argues that international law should
adopt the principles that all would adopt in a negotiation, unaffected
by different distributions of power among representatives of people
whose institutions and political culture are "well-ordered." 224 The
participants in such negotiations would adopt a principle to "observe

Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Just Cause Requirement: Should the
Denial of Self-Determination to Indigenous People Be a Valid Basis for Humanitarian
Intervention? Yes, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 699, 701-03 (2007) (discussing unilateral
intervention and its connection to indigenous populations); Fernando R. Tes6n, The
Vexing Problem of Authority in HumanitarianIntervention: A Proposal, 24 WIS. INT'L
L.J. 761, 771-72 (2006) [hereinafter Tes6n, Vexing Problem] (proposing a Court of
Human Security to oversee all responses to humanitarian crises including
intervention).
221.
See, e.g., KOFI ANNAN, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION 3-19 (1999)
(containing public statements by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding
intervention); TESON, supra note 220, at 3-155 (providing a philosophical defense of
humanitarian intervention); Tes6n, Vexing Problem, supra note 220, at 761-62 ("[Tlhe
institutions for humanitarian intervention should serve the cosmopolitan interests of
humanity, as opposed to the national interests of states and governments.").
222.
The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All,
129, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). Another former Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar,
expressed a similar sentiment when he said, "It is now increasingly felt that the
principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot
be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or
systematically violated with impunity." The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-

General on the Work of the Organization, IV, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/4/61 (Sept. 13, 1991), available at http://www.undemocracy.com/A-46-1.pdf.
223.
TESON, supra note 220, at 111.
224.
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 35 (1999).
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a duty of non-intervention," but not an absolute one.2 25
This
nonintervention norm requires a high standard of political order: the
state must provide substantive freedom and equality for all
citizens. 2 26 For Rawls, this prescription means that all citizens must
be able to participate in the political process in an effective and
informed way. 227
If a regime is not well-ordered, then the
nonintervention norm loses its force. Such would be the case, Rawls
postulates, in a modern-day Aztec society that "holds its lower class
as slaves, keeping the younger members available for human
sacrifices in temples." 228 There would be no moral objection to
intervening in this case because the society so obviously lacks the
basic requirements of a well-ordered society.
A final moral argument in favor of a responsibility to protect is
that the self-determination of political communities has inherent
moral importance. 229 As articulated by Walzer, the basic moral
principle is "always act so as to recognize and uphold communal
autonomy." 230 One corollary of this principle is that there is a strong
presumption that any intervention would violate the right to selfdetermination of the political community. 23 1 These norms facilitate
respect for cultural differences and political preferences. But in some
Most
situations, the presumptions should be disregarded.
importantly, even though 'ordinary' oppression" does not call for
intervention, 232 intervention is acceptable to end massive violations of
human rights that are so severe that "we must doubt the very
existence of a political community to which the idea of selfdetermination might apply."2 33 In this case, no deference should be
given to the decisions of a sovereign state.
The moral arguments justifying a responsibility to protect, then,
revolve around the idea that, at least in severe cases of violations of
individual rights, it is morally defensible-if not obligatory-for the
international community to intervene in a state's internal affairs to
prevent further such violations. Deontologically, the argument goes,
humanitarian intervention is right, and, to the extent that law should

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 93-94 n.6.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 90-91 (1977).
Id. at 90.

231.

Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,

9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 209, 210 (1980).
232.
Id. at 218.
233.
Id. at 101. The other justifications for intervention arise when (1) one
political community revolts against another political community, preventing it from
asserting its independence and (2) another foreign government intervenes to favor one
side while a civil war is in progress. Id. at 90.

296

VANDERBILT]OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 43:25S

track morality, it should also be legal. The next subpart examines
the legal arguments behind the responsibility to protect.

B. Legal Arguments for the Responsibility to Protect
Much of the debate surrounding the responsibility to protect has
focused on whether humanitarian intervention is legal under the
existing international legal framework. Thus, arguments tend to look
to the foundational sources of international law: the UN Charter,
treaties, and customary international law. Legal arguments in favor
of humanitarian intervention have a long history in international
relations, but this Article focuses on the more recent debate. 234
The UN Charter does not explicitly authorize humanitarian
intervention or the responsibility to protect. Indeed, it appears to do
the opposite: according to Article 2 of the Charter, "All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."23 5 The Charter does, however, commit the UN to promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all . . . ."236
The combination of these two provisions has led some lawyers to
argue that the Charter authorizes, or even commands, intervention to
protect individuals from human rights violations through the
assertion that such interventions are not aimed at the "territorial
integrity" or "political independence" of a state. 237 In this line of
thought, the UN Charter was intended to prevent wars of aggression
and was not intended to protect states from international judgment
on crimes committed against its citizens.2 38 When the international
community intervenes, it does so with pure intentions, and thus the
responsibility to protect does not fall afoul of the Charter's prohibition
against the use of force.

234.
Purportedly humanitarian interventions were undertaken by France,
Britain, and Russia to redress the Turkish massacre of the Greeks in 1830, by Austria,
France, Britain, and others in Syria in 1860, and by Russia to prevent Turkish
persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe in 1877. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian
Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW
AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 232 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
235.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
236.
Id. art. 55.
237.
See AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE
LEGAL CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-21
(1979) (explaining Article 2(4)); Lillich, supra note 234, at 236-37 (arguing that
humanitarian intervention does not violate the U.N. Charter).
238.
See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (noting that the purposes of the United
Nations include maintenance of "international peace and security" and "the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace" but not protection of
states from international judgments for crimes committed against their own citizens).
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The UN's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
reached its legal conclusion that the responsibility to protect is a
legally obligatory norm by looking at the 1948 Genocide Convention
as well. 239 According to the High-Level Panel, "Since then it has been
understood that genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all
and should never be tolerated." 240 The UN Charter states that the
maintenance of peace and security is one of the UN's principal
aims. 241 Therefore, the High-Level Panel concluded the following:
The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to
protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations
of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing,
which can properly be considered a threat to international security and
242
as such provoke action by the Security Council.

Even if the UN Charter does not provide for a responsibility to
protect, some scholars have argued that when the Security Council is
deadlocked, a preexisting right of humanitarian intervention under
customary international law should revive. 243 A rule of customary
international law develops through state practice with a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris), generally repeated over time by a
significant number of states. 244
In the case of humanitarian
intervention, states have long justified the use of force to protect
civilians from the predations of their own governments. 245 Professor
Rusen Ergec, speaking before the ICJ, highlighted India's
intervention in Eastern Pakistan, Tanzania's intervention in Uganda,
Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, and the West African countries'
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 24 6 If one adds to this list
interventions in the 1990s, it becomes clearer and clearer that states
do routinely practice the responsibility to protect, and they often
couch their arguments in the language of legal discourse. 247

239.

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,supra note 107,

200.

240.
Id.
241.
See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (stating that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security").

242.
243.

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supranote 107, 200.
See, e.g., Stanley Hoffman, Intervention: Should It Go On, Can It Go On?, in

ETHICS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION 26, 30 (Deen K. Chatterjee & Don E. Scheid eds.,

2003) (discussing alternatives to Security Council authorization).
244.
BROWNLIE, supra note 69, at 7.
245.
See Legality of Use of Force, supra note 92, at 12-13 (highlighting various
interventions justified by the purpose of protecting civilians from their own
governments).
246.
Id. at 12. Ergec limited his examples to interventions in the twentieth
century. For examples of humanitarian interventions prior to the 20th century, see
supranote 234 and accompanying text.
247.
For example, James Rubin, the State Department spokesman before the
NATO campaign in Kosovo, stated that "the Serb side is so far out of line with accepted
norms of international behavior, and the dangers of not taking preventative action are
so great in terms of humanitarian suffering and further violations of international law
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Critics of this viewpoint note that in the seminal case of
Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ concluded that custom did not
permit unilateral humanitarian intervention. 248 But the ICJ decided
this case long before the widely accepted interventions in the 1990s
and the adoption by both the General Assembly and the Security
Council of resolutions pronouncing the responsibility to protect. 249
These developments have significantly changed the state of
customary international law.
Some observers argue that even if a rule of customary
international law in favor of a responsibility to protect does not exist,
general principles of international law, in particular the doctrine of
necessity, require intervention in severe cases of violations of human
rights. 250 A state of necessity is defined as "the situation of a State
whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest threatened by
a grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in conformity with
what is required of it by an international obligation to another
State."251 As applied to humanitarian intervention, the state of

that we believe we have legitimate grounds to act." James P. Rubin, Spokesman, U.S
Dep't. of State, Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://usembassyisrael.org.il/publish /press/state/archive/1999/march/sd2317.htm.
248.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 134-35
(June 27) ("The use of force ... for the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua
cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States.").

249.

See id.; see also A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra

note 107, 200 (condemning non-intervention that serves to protect "atrocities, such as
large scale violations of international humanitarian law").

250.

See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 107, 1 200

("The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect
genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large-scale violations of international
humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing.").
251.
Commentary (FirstReading) on Article 33, 35 U.N GAOR Supp. (No. 10),
U.N. Doc. A/35/10, reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 34, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1980 (Part 2). The International Law Commission has expressed the
state of necessity in a slightly different way. It says the following:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of
that State, unless the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril; and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a
whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or
(b) The State contributed to the situation of necessity.

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 26, 56
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INTL L.
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necessity argues that while intervention may violate the UN
Charter's prohibition of the use of force, the intervenor's essential
interest excuses the act as a matter of international law. 252 Some
proposed essential interests, the values of which exceed the value of
nonintervention, include "the commission of genocide[, . . .
widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population, or
serious violations of recognised and fundamental international
human rights."2 53
Necessity, then, is a kind of safety valve through which the
international community can avoid the undesirable consequences of a
strict adherence to international rules governing the use of force. 2 54
There is some debate about whether a state of necessity makes an
otherwise illegal act legal or whether it just makes it excusable; 2 55
regardless, it has been invoked as a justification in numerous
occasions. For example, Belgium, brought before the ICJ for NATO's
intervention in Kosovo, gave the following defense listing the
elements of necessity:
First, what rule has been breached? We do not accept that any rule has
been breached. However, for the sake of argument, let us say that it is
the rule prohibiting the use of force. Where is the imminent peril, the
grave and imminent peril? There it was-. . . there it is still-the
humanitarian catastrophe recorded in the resolutions of the Security
Council-an impending peril. What are the higher values which this
intervention attempts to safeguard? They are rights ofjus cogens. It is
256
the collective security of an entire region.
Necessity, a general principle common to many national legal

systems and universally recognized as a part of international law, has

COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2). The final articles appear in
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 61 (2002).
252.
See Frederik Harhoff, Unauthorized Humanitarian Interventions-Armed
Violence in the Name of Humanity?, 70 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 65, 112-19 (2001) (discussing
humanitarian intervention in light of the prohibition of the use of force); Ian Johnstone,
The Plea of "Necessity" in InternationalLegal Discourse: HumanitarianIntervention
and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 387-88 (2005) (arguing that
intervention may be legal under the doctrine of necessity); Jens Elo Rytter,
Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to
Kosovo-and Beyond, 70 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 121, 133-36 (2001) (discussing the validity
of interventions without Security Counsel authorization); Ole Spiermann,

HumanitarianIntervention as a Necessity and the Threat or Use of Jus Cogens, 71
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 523, 542-43 (2002) (discussing issues related to necessity and the
use of force).
Harhoff, supra note 252, at 114.
253.
254.
Johnstone, supra note 252, at 339.
255.
See Michael D. Bayles, Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, in
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 429, 429-

458 (Michael Louis Corrado ed., 1994); see generally JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Albin Eser & George P. Fletcher eds., 1987) (discussing
the doctrine of necessity in international law).
256.
Legality of Use of Force, supra note 92, at 13-14.
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served as a legal bastion and a strong justification for the
responsibility to protect.
It at once allows the principle of
nonintervention to stand as a legal rule while creating some wiggle
room for states to intervene in extreme cases. In the end, however, it
must make some reference to the consequences of inaction and
engage in some balancing of harms and benefits. The following
subpart addresses consequential arguments in favor of a
responsibility to protect.
C. ConsequentialistArguments for a Responsibility to Protect
Consequential, or utilitarian, arguments in favor of a
responsibility to protect tend to focus on the ability of intervening
nations to stop widespread harm at some minimal cost. 25 7
Sometimes, the analysis is limited to the particular crisis-such as
Kosovo and the cost of a bombing campaign to stop the persecution of
ethnic Albanians. 258 Sometimes, the analysis looks at more long-term
results, such as the precedent that humanitarian intervention would
set. 259 What draws all the arguments together is the assertion that,
looking at the costs and benefits of intervention, adoption of a
responsibility to protect is justified. 2 60 At their core, of course,
consequential arguments are moral, in that their ultimate conclusion,
based on a cost-benefit analysis, is that intervention is right.2 61 But
they differ from the deontological moral arguments described above
because they do not argue that the acts in themselves are moral but
that, as a result of a balancing of harms, the action is justified. 262
A utilitarian approach to international humanitarian law is
widely accepted in both the law and scholarly publications. According
to the Geneva Conventions, the legality of attacking a particular
target depends on whether the incidental damage that is to be
expected from the attack is excessive in relation to the anticipated

257.
See Fernando Tes6n, Defending InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L LEGAL THEORY
87, 95 (2005) [hereinafter Tes6n, Defending International Law] (describing and
rejecting the utilitarian approach to humanitarian intervention).
258.
See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 87, at 829 (focusing on Kosovo and the
result of NATO's bombing campaign).
259.
See, e.g., id. at 834 (discussing the potential impact that NATO's bypass of
the U.N. Security Council may have on future humanitarian interventions).
260.
See Tes6n, Defending International Law, supra note 257, at 93-95
(describing how different theoretical approaches justify the responsibility to protect).
261.
Id. at 94.
262.
For a discussion of utilitarian and deontological approaches to
humanitarian intervention, see id. (arguing that "[tihe argument for humanitarian
intervention is located midway between strict deontological approaches and
consequential ones like utilitarianism").
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military advantage. 26 3 Indeed, the very definition of a responsibility
to protect appears to adopt a utilitarian approach. The ICISS's
report, A Responsibility to Protect, states that the responsibility to
protect is "the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe-from mass
murder and rape, from starvation-but that when they are unwilling
or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader
community." 264 The report thus endorses the view that a state has a
responsibility to intervene if it can avoid a catastrophe. The term
"avoidable" appears to make some reference to a cost-benefit analysis
because, if the costs of stopping a catastrophe exceed the benefits,
then it would create another type of catastrophe. 2 65 Or, as a
prominent philosopher has expressed it:
If the saving of lives is crucial, it may well be that the lives of more
citizens of any particular state would be better protected by the
initiation of war than by the virtually unqualified respect for territorial
integrity. .. [I]t seems to me that it must. . . be shown that fewer lives
266
will be lost in the process [of intervention].

Both of these approaches, then, focus narrowly on the cost of
intervention and the benefits in terms of lives saved.
Other utilitarian theories of a responsibility to protect consider a
wider variety of consequences of intervention. Instead of focusing
solely on the intervention itself, they look to the long-term
consequences for the international system and global governance.
The UN's High-Level Panel itself worried about the consequences of
not adopting a responsibility to protect. They argued that it would be
unacceptable if states could invoke the principle of nonintervention in
internal affairs to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities. 267
Setting such a precedent would only encourage countries to persecute
politically unfavorable or powerless groups with full knowledge that
they could do so with impunity.268

263.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
264.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at
VIII.
265.
See id. at 44 (discussing the financial consequences of intervention).
266.
Richard Wasserstrom, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 536, 543 (1978)
(reviewing MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977)).

267.
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supranote 107, 200.
268.
See Ausma Zehanat Khan, The Unquiet Dead: HumanitarianIntervention,
the Fall of Srebrenica, and Political Will as a Normative Linchpin, 42 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 704, 705 (2004) (arguing that realization of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention
is critical because "the danger of unwillingness to articulate and stand by conditions
and circumstances that require states to intervene is that future Srebrenicas will occur
undeterred and with impunity").

302

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 43:255

Establishing a robust principle of the responsibility to protect, on
the other hand, would send a strong signal to countries around the
world: criminal acts against a state's own citizens will not go
unpunished. This concept is one of the main goals of international
law, that is, to establish internal law as a binding obligation that
cannot just be followed when convenient and ignored when needed. 269
Indeed, some observers have argued that the development of a
responsibility to protect is essential to the survival of the current
international legal system. 270 The strength of a legal system is
connected above all to its legitimacy in the eyes of its constituents. 2 7 '
A system that makes it illegal to act in the face of "the universally
recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic
violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences" 272
loses its legitimacy in the eyes of both populations and states
themselves. 273

VI. THE CASE FOR A RESPONSIBILITY

TO PROTECT THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

A brief survey of the major rationales used to justify the adoption
of a responsibility to protect in international law demonstrates the
strength of the argument for extending such a responsibility to
protect to the freedom of speech. Every rationale for the adoption of a
responsibility to protect has equal application in the case of violations
of the freedom of expression as it does in the case of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In some cases, the argument
that the international community has a responsibility to protect the
freedom of speech of individuals may be even stronger.

269.
The literature on the binding nature of international law is vast. Fernando
Tes6n has summarized, "There is a generalized sense that sovereign governments pay
only lip-service to international law, and that, when they do refer to international
rights and duties, their apparently public-spirited statements are not statements of
law, but self-serving utterances cloaked in legal language." Fernando R. Tes6n,
InternationalLaw, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 941, 941 (Peter Cane
& Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).
270.

See INVL COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8,

at 51-52 (discussing the sources of the legitimacy of the United Nations).

271.

A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 107, $ 204

("The effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal
order, depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common
perception of their legitimacy . . .").
272.
Press Release, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, Two Concepts of
Sovereignty, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 (Sept. 18, 1999).
273.
In the run-up to the Iraq War, Bush asked the United Nations General
Assembly, "Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be
irrelevant?' John King & Suzanne Malveaux, Bush: U.S. Will Move on IraqIf U.N. Won't,
CNN.com, Sept. 13, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002[US/09/12/bush.speech.un/.
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A. Moral Arguments
Moral arguments that place the value of individual rights above
the value of territorial sovereignty naturally apply to the freedom of
expression. Free speech is indubitably a fundamental human right,
as expressed in every major international human rights instruments
since World War II.274 Protection of this right, then, carries greater
importance than upholding the now antiquated notion of inviolable
state sovereignty.
A different logic applies with moral arguments that propose an
international law based on the choices of a well-ordered society.
Rawls argues that such a society would choose to incorporate a
doctrine of nonintervention in order to give due regard to cultural
differences.27 5
Such a system would seem to preclude the
intervention of the international community in order to protect the
freedom of speech of another country's citizens. But Rawls is careful
to note that the nonintervention norm applies only when the state
guarantees freedom and equality for all, a condition met by allowing
all citizens to participate in the political process. 276 Freedom of
speech is essential to participating effectively in the political
process. 27 7 Without the ability to express one's ideas in an effective
way, a citizen cannot meaningfully participate in government
debates.
If the freedom of speech is squelched, then Rawls's
preconditions for a well-ordered society are not met, and a state loses
its presumption of territorial integrity. The international community
must intervene in order to allow the effective speech.
Walzer's moral position that the intervention of the international
community violates the right to self-determination of political
communities also creates a nonintervention presumption. In other
words, "[i]ntervention usually thwarts, to some extent, political
processes and aspirations which are, to some extent, worthy of
respect."2 7
But Walzer himself admits that oppression of one's
citizens may negate the presumption.2 79 The presumption should be

274.
See African Charter, supra note 174, art. 9, 1 2 (outlining the free speech
rights); ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19, T 2 (establishing free speech as a fundamental
human right); UDHR, supra note 4, art. 19 (including freedom of expression as a
fundamental human right protected by the instrument); European Convention, supra
note 152, art. 10 (establishing freedom of speech in European nations).
275.
RAWLS, supra note 224, at 25.
276.
Id. at 24.
277.
Participation in the political process is one of the main purposes of the
freedom of speech. See, e.g., Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 882 (1963) ("The third main function of a system of
freedom of expression is to provide for participation in decision-making.").

278.

Richard W. Miller, Respectable Oppressors, Hypocritical Liberators:

Morality, Intervention and Reality, in ETHICS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION, supra note
243, at 215, 237 (Deen K. Chatterjee & Don E. Scheid eds., 2003).
279.
Id. at 220-21.
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overridden, he argues, when "we must doubt the very existence of a
political community to which the idea of self-determination might
apply." 280 Cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity definitely amount to such massive violations of human
rights, but so too do violations of the freedom of expression. Indeed,
self-determination within the context of a political community
depends to a great extent on the ability of citizens to debate and air
their ideas. When such debate is stifled, the decisions of the
government as representative of the will of the people must be
doubted. The international community, then, if it truly wants to
respect the self-determination of peoples, must protect above all the
freedom of speech.
B. Legal Arguments
Like moral arguments, legal arguments in favor of a
responsibility to protect appear to apply equally to violations of the
freedom of expression as they do to violations such as genocide and
crimes against humanity. The relevant legal precedents, with the
exception of the most recent developments actually articulating the
responsibility to protect,do not differentiate between genocide and
gross violations of human rights.28 1
The UN Charter, for example, outlaws the use of force but refers
to its commitment to promoting universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights. 282 It makes no distinction between genocide and
other violations of human rights. 283 Some scholars argue that
intervention due to a responsibility to protect is not aimed at the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state.2 84 This
argument would appear to apply equally to any kind of human rights
violation. The established nature of the freedom of expression in
international law, as evidenced by the multiple human rights
treaties, certainly allows the conclusion that intervention to protect
this fundamental right is legal under the UN Charter.
The argument from the perspective of customary international
law holds just as much force. The question here is whether, as a
matter of customary international law, states have repeated a
practice with a sense of legal obligation. 285 It is true that most
280.
WALZER, supra note 229, at 101.
281.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 6-27 (referring to human rights
generally).
282.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; id. art. 55.
283.
See id. art. 55 (not differenting between genocide and other violations of
human rights).
284.
See RIFAAT, supra note 237, at 120-21 (examining the responsibility to
protect in light of territorial sovereignty rights); LilHich, supra note 234, 235-44
(discussing the responsibility to protect).
285.
BROWNLIE, supra note 69, at 7.
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humanitarian interventions in the past century have been intended
to stop the mass killings of civilians. 286 At the same time, however,
they also often involve the suppression of expression, particularly
religious expression.2 87
Obviously, debates about customary
international law will always revolve around how broadly or narrowly
one should interpret a custom, but one legitimate interpretation is
that custom allows intervention in the affairs of a state in order to
prevent widespread suppression of the freedom of speech-especially
if such intervention is carried out by an international coalition with
proper purposes. 2 88
Likewise, the state of necessity provides a legal basis for a
responsibility to protect in cases of severe violations of the freedom of
expression. In order for necessity to justify an action, a state must
have an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril,
and the sole means of safeguarding that interest must be to act not in
conformity with a particular rule of international law. 289 The
essential interest involved here is the protection of a fundamental
human right: the freedom of speech. In fact, commentators generally
seem to accept the notion that severe violations of fundamental rights
should be included as essential interests. 290 If the sole means of
preventing a state from depriving its citizens of such a fundamental
right as the freedom of speech is to intervene, then the doctrine of
necessity provides firm ground for doing so.

C. ConsequentialArguments
What of utilitarian arguments? At the broader level, in terms of
setting a standard that states cannot deny their citizens basic human
rights, the argument seems to apply perfectly to the freedom of
speech. International treaties establish a clear commitment of the
world community to protecting the right of an individual to
communicate and receive ideas. 29 1 If international law wants to
ensure the protection of this right, it would make sense to create a

286.
See Lillich, supra note 234, at 232 (describing examples of humanitarian
intervention in the past century).
287.
Examples include the French, British, and Russian intervention to prevent
the Turkish massacre of Greeks in 1830, and the Russian intervention to prevent
Turkish persecution of Christians in Eastern Europe in 1877. See id.
288.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REIATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. m (1987)
(including suppression of the freedom of speech amongst the violations of human rights
justifying intervention under customary international law).
289.
Commentary (FirstReading) on Article 33, supra note 251, at 33.
290.
See, e.g., Harhoff, supra note 252, at 114 (arguing that the prevention of
"serious violations of recognised and fundamental international human rights" is an
essential interest of a state).
291.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19, 2 ("Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideal of all kinds.").
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norm by which countries have an obligation to intervene to prevent a
government from depriving its citizens of the right.
States
considering actions that would suppress the freedom of expression of
their citizens would therefore know that they would face a backlash
from the international community. They would know that they could
not hide behind the shield of sovereignty.
So, too, would the extension of the responsibility to protect to
include the freedom of speech have positive consequences for the
legitimacy of the international legal system. The proliferation of
human rights treaties after World War II raised expectations that
individual rights would no longer be subject to the whims of nationstates. 29 2 International instruments like the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
guarantee certain rights to all citizens. 29 3 But the lack of enforceable
A system that
provisions makes these guarantees illusory.
simultaneously promises universal respect for the freedom of speech
and refuses to take steps to protect that freedom faces severe
contradictions, contradictions that threaten the legitimacy of the
system.
If the international community adopted a broader
responsibility to protect, this discrepancy could be solved, with
favorable consequences for the entire legal system.
A more difficult situation arises when one considers just the
immediate consequences of intervention to protect freedom of
expression. If the equation of costs and benefits includes only lives
saved and lost, the suppression of expression may seem like a trivial
crime because it does not directly cause the loss of any lives. Any
military intervention to protect this freedom would probably lead to
the loss of human life, thereby causing costs to exceed benefits. For
this reason, intervention must be considered in a broader sense.
Intervention does not necessarily need to be military intervention.
Kofi Annan himself has recognized the imperative of considering
intervention as something encompassing more than just the use of
force. In 1999, after the Kosovo bombing campaign, he wrote in The
Economist, "A tragic irony of many of the crises that go unnoticed or
unchallenged in the world today is that they could be dealt with by
far less perilous acts of intervention than the one we saw this year in
Yugoslavia."294

One potential form of intervention could involve using the
internet to spread the message of individuals whose speech is being
suppressed. This technique would allow those individuals more
effective access to an audience. Radio and television are still
292.
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 1-27 (discussing the civil and political
rights of individuals); UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 1-29 (creating binding international
obligations for nation-states to respect certain, enumerated individual rights).
293.
ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 1-27; UDHR, supra note 4, arts. 1-29.
294.
Annan, supra note 98, at 49.
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powerful methods of communication as well, and interventions
similar to the broadcast of Radio Free Europe into the affected
countries could have strong effects.2 95 Such interventions would have
to be aimed at granting citizens the ability to communicate and
receive ideas that would otherwise be suppressed by the government.
This is not to dismiss the ultimate option of military
intervention. Active suppression of political dissent in a wide subset
of society, including through the use of torture and imprisonment to
exclude groups from asserting their political will, might justify the
use of military force. This is instead meant to explain that military
intervention need not be considered the sole form of intervention and
that the spread of internet access, among other communication
outlets, opens new avenues for citizens to share information and
debate ideas.

VII. CRITICISMS

Two major criticisms arise in any discussion of expanding the
international community's responsibility to protect the rights of
citizens: First, is it realistic? 2 96 Second, will it serve as a pretext for
war?29 7 In the case of freedom of expression, there is some question
whether states will be able to summon the political will to use
military force in another country in order to prevent the closing off of
certain avenues of expression. Furthermore, because the freedom of
expression is a somewhat amorphous concept, its violation may
provide an excuse for states interested in intervening in another
country for ulterior motives. This Part will address these two
concerns.

A. Enforcement of the Responsibility to ProtectFree Speech
Expanding the concept of the responsibility to protect to include
the right to free speech entails some difficult questions. One of these
questions is whether it is politically feasible or desirable. After all,
closing down newspapers and preventing public speeches are crimes
that pale in comparison to the crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity. More importantly, the use of force to

295.
See, e.g., Johanna Granville, Radio Free Europe's Impact on the Kremlin in
the Hungarian Crisis of 1956: Three Hypotheses, 39 CAN. J. HIST. 515, 516-18 (2004)
(describing the impact of Radio Europe).
296.
See D'Amato, supra note 49, at 1112 (discussing the views expounded by
critics of international law).
See, e.g., Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur, supra note 90, at 23 (expressing
297.
concern that departure from U.N. standards will open a "Pandora's box" of military
interventions).
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prevent such violations of international law seems grossly
disproportionate: troops marching into a country to restore free
speech could, in certain circumstances, appear quite incongruous.
Furthermore, states might struggle to summon the political will
necessary to send in such troops. A seminal question thus arises:
Would an expanded view of the responsibility to protect be
enforceable in a politically acceptable way? There are at least three
primary reasons why such a view of the responsibility to protect is
enforceable.
First, the idea that widespread violations of the freedom of
speech are outlawed under international law is not radical at all but
rather a fundamental precept of customary law. According to the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, "A state
violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages,

or condones

. . . (g) a consistent

pattern of gross

violations of internationally recognized human rights."29 8
The
numerous human rights treaties of the postwar period, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, clearly
establish the right to free speech as an internationally recognized
human right. 299 The jump from recognizing a fundamental right to
protecting it is a small one indeed. The UN itself has recognized that
victims of gross violations of international human rights law must
have a remedy for such violations.3 00
Second, the responsibility to protect is not just about the use of
force: it is about an obligation on the part of the international
community to protect certain rights. 30 ' This obligation includes, but
is not limited to, the use of force. 302 Indeed, the ramifications of the
responsibility to protect, even in its traditional, non-expansive form,
are far-reaching. For example, if the international community has a
responsibility to protect citizens from certain violations of their
rights, then perhaps individual countries have an affirmative

298.
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ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 19; UDHR, supra note 4, art. 19.
300.
See G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006)
(obligating the states to provide remedies for victims of human rights violations).
301.
The General Assembly adopted the following language concerning the
responsibility to protect:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity... . In this
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 110,
Id. TT 119, 138-39.
302.
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obligation to vote in certain ways in the Security Council. Thus, a
veto by one of the five permanent members of measures aimed at
protecting citizens might be considered an invalid veto from the point
of view of international law. 303 Ignoring the veto of a permanent
member might be politically implausible, but the legal status of an
invalid veto could conceivably affect the legitimacy of acting outside
the ambit of the Security Council. Similarly, states might have an
obligation, rather than just a right, to criticize countries for their
violations of free speech.
Third, the responsibility to protect already incorporates
precautionary principles that prevent the kinds of abuses that some
commentators worry about. The International Commission proposed
that any intervention use "proportional means" or, in other words,
that the "scale, duration and intensity of the .

.

. intervention should

be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection
The international community, in considering any
objective."30 4
intervention, would have to weigh the proportionality of the response
to the severity of the violation of international law. Intervention may
come in many forms, as mentioned above. It need not only--or even
primarily-involve the use of military force. The prevalence of the
internet today opens new pathways for communicating with wide
audiences. Radio and television broadcasts are still effective tools of
message diffusion, as seen to terrible consequences in Rwanda. At
least one commentator has argued that international law should
sanction the jamming of radio frequencies to prevent dissemination of
incitements to genocide.305 Alternatively, countries could transmit
"counterbroadcasts" to communicate messages that have been
suppressed. 306
But all of these questions raise a larger point about the
definition of the freedom of expression. As the importance of free
speech increases in the modern world, the simple language of human
rights treaties on what free speech includes will no longer suffice.
The international community must engage in a broader discussion
about how to conceive the freedom of expression in international law.
Much time has already been spent arguing over the status of hate

303.

See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8,

at XIII ("The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to
apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to
obstruct the passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human
protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.").
304.
Id. at XII.
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Radio Jamming,91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 628, 650-51 (1997).
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See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 371 (2003) ("The United States could destroy the antenna. It could transmit
'counterbroadcasts' urging perpetrators to stop the genocide. Or it could jam the hate
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speech in international law.30 7 But if the freedom of expression is to
be taken seriously as a norm of international law, its contours must
be sketched out more fully. Does the international community have
an affirmative obligation to provide methods of communication to
foreign citizens? Must it restrict the speech of some in order to
empower the speech of others? What kinds of interventions are
needed to strengthen the freedom of expression? These are not easy
questions, but they must be addressed if the international community
is to truly fulfill the promise of human rights for all.
B. The Responsibility to Protect as a Pretext for War
Perhaps the greatest worry that scholars and countries have
expressed concerning the concept of a responsibility to protect is that
it could be used as a pretext for war.308 Critics of a responsibility to
protect in particular and humanitarian intervention in general point
out that aggressors rarely explain wars as solely self-interested
ones.3 09 Instead, the initiators of war generally couch their positions
in the language of self-defense or morality.3 10 History contains many
such incidents. For example, in 1815, Prince Metternich of Austria
formed a "Holy Alliance" to restore the balance of power in Europe

See, e.g., Defeis, supra note 126, at 60-78 (describing regulation of hate
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Foundationsof InternationalLaw Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1
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countries).
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77-95
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(discussing the legal and political aspect of interventions); Tom J. Farer, An Inquiry
into the Legitimacy of HumanitarianIntervention, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 185, 192-93 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,
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See MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING
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intervention).
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See id. (discussing state justification for intervention). According to
Finnemore,
[e]very intervention leaves a long trail of justification in its wake . . . . When
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after the Napoleonic Wars and to protect the current regimes against
revolution.3 1 ' However, in justifying the alliance, he said that the
"Holy Alliance was not an institution for the suppression of the rights
of nations." 312 It "was solely an emanation of the pietistic feelings of
the Emperor Alexander and the application of the principles of
Christianity to politics."3 1 3
Any acceptance of a right-or even a duty-to intervene in the
internal affairs of a state will thus give even greater room for states
to engage in war, because they will have firm legal backing for their
position. Oscar Schacter, an international law scholar, argues that "it
is highly undesirable to have a new rule allowing humanitarian
intervention, for that could provide a pretext for abusive
intervention."3 14 He concludes that "it is better to acquiesce in a
violation ... than to adopt a principle that would open a wide gap in
31 5
the barrier against unilateral use of force."
According to this line of thought, then, the expansion of the
controversial responsibility to protect doctrine to include freedom of
expression will only increase the potential that states will use the
doctrine as a pretext for war. They need only cite some violation of
individuals' freedom of expression to justify a war. In the eyes of
such critics, the better approach would be to cabin the discretion of
countries to intervene.3 16 If a responsibility to protect must be
accepted in international law, the argument goes, it should be
narrowly limited to a few exceptionally egregious violations of human
rights: genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
The response to this critique of an expansive version of the
responsibility to protect is twofold. First, the responsibility to protect
already has well-defined limits. Its application should never be
unilateral. The relevant UN documents make clear that the use of
The
force should be authorized by the Security Council.31 7
responsibility to intervene only applies when the individual state is
unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from violations of their
rights.31 8 Intervention should be proportionate, meaning that the
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least harmful means of stopping the violation should be adopted,
preferably through nonviolent methods.
Furthermore, the development of a broader and more consistent
notion of the responsibility to protect may actually decrease the
occurrence of wars with ulterior motives. Using social science and
political science research, Ryan Goodman has described the process
by which law and legitimacy regulate state behavior.3 19 According to
his model, "encouraging aggressive states to justify using force as an
exercise of humanitarian intervention can facilitate conditions for
peace between those states and their prospective targets."3 20 Forcing
governments to cast their justifications for the use of force as
protection of human rights, including free speech, will thus alter
domestic situations in the intervening state and lead to less war.
Legal, moral, and utilitarian approaches can hardly argue with this
result.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This Article has attempted to demonstrate the importance of
expanding the responsibility to protect to include freedom of
expression. In other words, the international community has an
obligation to intervene in a country where the state is violating the
free speech rights of its own citizens. Currently, however, the UN
has interpreted the "responsibility to protect" as arising only in cases
of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other large-scale loss of life. As this
Article has argued, this interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the
expectations created by the numerous post-World War II human
rights treaties, which guarantee to all people a wide panoply of
Furthermore, the arguments justifying an
individual rights.
international obligation to intervene in the case of genocide are just
as valid, if not more, when applied to an obligation to intervene in the
case of widespread violations of free expression. In order to close this
gap in international law, the international community should adopt a
broader concept of the responsibility to protect--one that includes
protection of the right to free speech.
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